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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following hypothetical:
There are two Web sites. The first one, an online news report,
publishes an article about copyright infringement featuring a
hyperlink at its end which leads readers to a site [that] the arti-
cle's publisher knows contains unlawful material-an illegal
software code, perhaps, or a pirated music file or an unauthor-
ized copy of a secret religious text. Meanwhile, the publisher of
the second Web site, a lone crusader who believes that all infor-
mation should be freely available to everyone, publishes an arti-
cle with the exact same link. Question: May a court place the
two publishers on the scales and reasonably conclude that one is
engaging in lawful linking activity while the other has perpe-
trated a legal no-no?1
An issue analogous to this hypothetical was addressed by United
States District Court Judge Kaplan in Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes.2 In short, the court resolved the issue by enjoining the de-
fendants from maintaining hyperlinks3 from their site to third-party
sites offering a computer utility called Decode Content Scrambling
System (DeCSS).4 The primary attribute of DeCSS is its ability to de-
crypt or "rip" encrypted Digital Versatile Discs (DVDs).' During the
manufacturing process, the contents of a DVD are encrypted with a
process called Content Scramble System (CSS) that prevents the DVD
1. Carl S. Kaplan, Cyber Law Journal: Assessing Linking Liability, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8,
2000), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/08/technology/O8CYBERLAW.html.
Mr. Kaplan's article, viewed in online format, was the genesis of this Note.
2. 111 F. Supp. 2d294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
3. A hyperlink is text or graphics that, when clicked, takes the user from the current page
being viewed to the page referenced in the hyperlink. Technically speaking, the link does not
"take" the user anywhere. Rather, the link is a set of instructions that when executed, causes the
user's web browser (e.g., Microsoft's Internet Explorer or Netscape's Navigator) to locate the
Internet address or URL for the referenced site, from which it requests a copy of the file contain-
ing the data that the new web page consists of. See Nicos L. Tsilas, Minimizing Potential Liabil-
ity Associated with Linking and Framing on The World Wide Web, 8 CoMM. LAW CONSPECTUS
85 (Winter 2000).
4. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 340.
5. Id. at 311.
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from being played on anything other than a licensed DVD player ca-
pable of decoding the encrypted disc.' Once decrypted, the content of
the DVD is unscrambled and may be copied.' The Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act (DMCA) makes it unlawful to provide, offer or
otherwise traffic in any technology that allows for the decryption or
circumvention of technological measures intended to protect the access
or use of copyrighted digital materials, such as encryption.9 Beyond
merely holding that the defendants violated the Act by posting copies
of the program on their web site,' ° the court held that establishing and
maintaining links to third-party web sites was equivalent to posting."
As a result, the court concluded that linking was equivalent to "pro-
viding, offering, or otherwise trafficking" in DeCSS.'
A summary of the competing principles involved is perhaps best
stated by Judge Kaplan himself:
[T]he dispute between these parties is simply put if not nec-
essarily simply resolved. Plaintiffs have invested huge
sums... in reliance upon ... [assurances] that they will have
the exclusive right to copy and distribute those motion pic-
tures for economic gain. Defendants, on the other hand, are
adherents of a movement that believes that information
should be available without charge to anyone clever enough
to break into the computer systems .... Less radically, they
have raised a legitimate concern about the possible impact on
traditional fair use of access control measures in the digital
era. Each side is entitled to its views. In our society, however,
clashes of competing interests like this are resolved by Con-
gress. For now, at least, Congress has resolved this clash in
the DMCA and in plaintiffs' favor. 3
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes is about much more
than decrypting DVDs. It raises questions regarding the extent to
which fundamental values will be recognized in cyberspace and how
regulation of the Internet will impact those values. This Note focuses
6. Id. The licensing agreements between the DVD distributors and the DVD player
manufacturers mandate that the manufacturer engineer its players so as not to produce an output
capable of being recorded. Thus, CSS prevents copying by forcing manufacture of playback only
DVD players. See infra note 39.
7. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 311.
8. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860-2918 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 17 U.S.C.).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a), (b) (1998).
10. A web site typically refers to one or more web pages maintained by the same person or
entity and consisting of a home and secondary pages containing a variety of content.
11. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 339.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 345-46.
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on the application of the DMCA to prohibit the posting and linking of"circumvention technology"14 on the Internet, while also addressing
the larger issue of the unintended consequences that regulating cyber-
space can have on free expression. Because hypertext links play such a
fundamental role in the utility of the Internet, this Note argues that
the application of the DMCA's anti-trafficking provisions to enjoin
linking places a significant and unwarranted burden on the Internet as
a forum for free expression.
Section II is intended to provide a brief background of the tech-
nological and legal environment in which the Reimerdes controversy
arose. Section III focuses on the factual background and rationale for
the Reimerdes decision. Section IV then analyzes the rule of law pro-
duced by the decision and the impact that this decision has on free
speech in cyberspace. Finally, this Note concludes that any prohibi-
tion banning hyperlinks should be granted only under extraordinary
circumstances because of the potential for creating a substantial chill-
ing effect on the Internet as an engine for free expression.
II. THE WEB, FREE EXPRESSION, COPYRIGHT, AND THE DMCA
The World Wide Web has revolutionized the way people and
businesses communicate ideas and obtain and disseminate informa-
tion. Cyberspace provides an optimal platform for publishers to dis-
seminate their ideas to millions of people around the world simultane-
ously. Moreover, virtually anyone with access to the Internet can
become a publisher because the transaction costs and barriers to entry
in cyberspace are nominal compared to the costs of publishing in real
space. With an Internet connection, any computer user can become a
virtual worldwide "town crier" or "pamphleteer."'" The potential
uses of the Internet are limited only by the scope of the human
imagination. In the words of the "inventor" of the Internet, Tim
Berners-Lee:
The dream behind the Web is of a common information space
in which we communicate by sharing information. Its universal-
ity is essential: the fact that a hypertext link can point to any-
thing, be it personal, local or global, be it draft or highly pol-
ished. There was a second part of the dream, too, dependent on
the Web being so generally used that it became a realistic mirror
(or in fact the primary embodiment) of the ways in which we
14. Circumvention technology refers to any technology, including computer software, that
enables one to circumvent a technological measure that controls access to, or restricts the use of,
copyrighted digital media. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a), (b).
15. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
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work and play and socialize. That was that once the state of our
interactions was on line, we could then use computers to help us
analyze it, make sense of what we are doing, where we individu-
ally fit in, and how we can better work together. 6
Like any technology, however, there are side effects and unin-
tended consequences. Noxious computer programs such as viruses
and Trojan horse programs invade computers, e-mail inboxes are
bombarded with "junk" e-mails, and "cybersquatters" attempt to
capitalize on the names of others. Just as the positive potential of the
Internet is limitless, so is the potential for abuse. The challenge posed
to Congress and to the courts is to create rules that minimize the nega-
tive externalities created by the technology without stifling the creative
and commercial potential of the medium.
Digital technology probably impacts the copyright industry to a
greater extent than any other industry. Simultaneously, the Internet
presents both an incredible opportunity and a disastrous nightmare for
the copyright industry. On one hand, the Internet provides a new
frontier as a potential delivery medium for movies, music, games and
other entertainment. On the other, it represents a giant, global copy-
ing machine, where pirated versions of copyrighted works can be dis-
seminated around the world instantaneously. 7
Traditional copyright law has focused on attacking the infringing
activity, rather than the means of infringement. 8 When copyright law
was originally conceived, the primary concern was the reproduction of
books, maps and charts.' 9 A copyright infringement suit was prose-
cuted simply by locating the producer of copies and obtaining an in-
junction to prevent further copying or by seizing his printing press.
Not only was the infringer relatively static, but the cost of equipment
presented a significant barrier of entry to the illicit trade of book pirat-
ing.
Technology has radically altered the paradigm. The means of
copying, a computer, is readily obtainable and allows the digital pirate
to make near-perfect copies of digital audio and video works at very
16. Tim Berners-Lee, The World Wide Web: A Very Short Personal History, available at
http://www.w3.org/People/Berners-Lee/ShortHistory.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2000).
17. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND THE ROLE
OF THE WTO, SPECIAL STUDIES 2, TABLE OF COMMITMENTS 53-54 (1998). This is true at
least with respect to digital works, to the extent that a digital copy of a text, song or movie can be
duplicated without any degradation of quality and the incremental cost of each additional copy is
theoretically zero.
18. See generally, 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
§ 12A.01 (2001) [hereinafter 3 NIMMER].
19. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283,
294 (1996).
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little cost. Unlike the bulky printing press, which had to be acquired
at a considerable cost and required a fixed location, the Internet pi-
rate's device, the computer, is inexpensive and portable. Thus, the
barriers to entry facing a traditional copyright infringer are absent
with respect to a digital infringer, who only needs a computer and ac-
cess to the Internet. Moreover, the Internet allows a copyright in-
fringer to distribute perfect copies around the world instantaneously
and anonymously. Traditional copyright enforcement is ineffective in
such an environment due to its reactive nature--once a copy has been
made, it can be distributed instantly to a large number of individuals.
The copyright industry, aware of this threat, has begun using techno-
logical measures such as content scrambling and encryption as a bar-
rier to infringement. These efforts were aided by Congress's enact-
ment of the DMCA in 1998.
This massive piece of legislation shifted the focus from the in-
fringer to the infringing technology. Codified into the Copyright Act,
Title 17, the DMCA enhances traditional copyright protections and
the private efforts of the copyright industry by making it unlawful,
with certain limitations, to circumvent a technological measure used
by a copyright holder to prevent unauthorized access to a copyrighted
work.2" Additionally, the DMCA makes it illegal to manufacture or
traffic in a technology that facilitates the circumvention of a techno-
logical measure intended to protect against such unauthorized access
to a digital work.21 Moreover, the DMCA prohibits the dissemination
of a technology that circumvents measures intended to prevent subse-
quent use of a digital work, such as copying.22
Although both circumvention of access controls and the dissemi-
nation of technology facilitating such circumvention are proscribed
under the Act, circumvention of use controls is not. Only trafficking
in technology facilitating such circumvention is unlawful under the
Act.23 This means that an individual, who has obtained authorized
access to a digital work, may legally circumvent a measure placed on
the work that prevents copying without the copyright holder's permis-
sion, but that individual may not circumvent a technology preventing
unauthorized access in the first instance. One commentator explains
the difference between circumventing access as opposed to use con-
20. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1).
21. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(2).
23. The distinction between "access" and "use" is subtle yet critical and will be explored
below. In a nutshell, access controls prevent unauthorized access to a work, whereas use controls
prevent unauthorized use of the work, such as copying, even after authorized access has been
obtained.
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trols by analogizing the former to breaking and entering a castle and
the latter to committing disorderly conduct after obtaining authorized
access.
24
The DMCA imposes substantial penalties for violations of its
provisions. The remedies under the Act provide for injunctive relief
as well as actual and statutory damages.25 In addition to civil damages,
criminal penalties may be imposed if the offender is engaged in willful
conduct for the purpose of "commercial advantage or private financial
gain. ,26
The trafficking provisions represent what Professor Lawrence
Lessig refers to as "indirect" regulation in cyberspace. 27  Rather than
directly regulating copyright infringement, the government instead
regulates the "code"--circumvention technology-in order to control
copyright infringement by making it more difficult. 2  This "indirect"
regulation of the dissemination of a technology, DeCSS, is what was at
issue in Reimerdes.
III. THE CASE: UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC. V. REIMERDES
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes marks the first applica-
tion of the anti-trafficking provisions of the DMCA. Part A of this
section provides the factual context of the case. Part B details the
court's factual findings. Finally, Part C examines the statutory and
constitutional analysis that the court employed in order to enjoin the
defendants from posting and linking to DeCSS under the DMCA.
Judge Kaplan's opinion provides a detailed statutory and consti-
tutional analysis29 as well as extensive background on the technology
of the digital media and the Internet.3 ° It must be noted at the outset
24. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 18, § 12A.03[D][1]-[3], at 12A-29-12A-32.
25. 17 U.S.C. § 1203(a)-(c).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 1204. The maximum penalties for a criminal offense under the Act are five
years in prison and/or a monetary penalty of $500,000 or both. Id.
27. Lawrence Lessig, The Constitution of Code: Limitations on Choice-Based Critiques of Cy-
berspace Regulation, 5 COMM. L. CONSPECTUS 181, 184-86 (1997); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG,
CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). Professor Lessig theorizes that in the "real
space," non-Internet world, behavior is regulated by law, norms and nature. In cyberspace, the
regulatory influence of nature is substituted by code. However, in real space nature is static; in
cyberspace, code is plastic. Nature is stable and not susceptible to manipulation by law; code is
unstable but susceptible to manipulation by law. Because the stabilizing influence of nature (real
space code) is erased in cyberspace, it is necessary to supplement it with regulation of code. Be-
cause of the difficulty in controlling behavior by force of law and the relative ease in controlling
behavior by code, government uses law to regulate code, which in turn regulates behavior in cy-
berspace.
28. Seesupranote27.
29. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
30. Id. at 303-10.
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that this is not a copyright infringement case but one addressing a hy-
brid doctrine that has been referred to as "para-copyright."'" Al-
though the DMCA is contained within the Copyright Act, it does not
directly concern copyright infringement and does not require proof of
actual infringement by the defendants or by anyone else for that mat-
ter.32 Thus, the focus of the case is on violation of the DMCA, rather
than infringement. In fact, as explained below, a violation of the Act
can occur absent any evidence of infringement.
A. Factual Background
Eight motion picture studios3 brought an action in the Federal
District Court for the Southern District of New York under the
DMCA to enjoin the defendants from posting DeCSS.34 According to
the complaint, DeCSS violated the DMCA due to its ability to decrypt
the copy control mechanism used to protect movies distributed in
DVD format.3" The defendants maintained a web site called
2600.com3 6 in connection with a print magazine called 2600: The
Hacker Quarterly.37
In order to prevent unauthorized copying and piracy of the con-
tent on DVDs, 3 the movie studios employed a scrambling technology
31. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 18, § 12A.05[D], at 12A-72. Para-copyright refers to the
fact that the DMCA protects copyright management systems rather than copyrighted works. Id.
§ 12A.18[B], at 12A-174. A person may violate the DMCA in the absence of any infringing
conduct by that person or another.
32. Id.
33. The eight motion picture studio plaintiffs were: Universal City Studios, Inc.; Para-
mount Pictures Corporation; Metro -Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc.; TriStar Pictures, Inc.; Co-
lumbia Pictures Industries, Inc.; Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P.; Disney Enterprises,
Inc.; and Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation.
34. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 303
35. Id.
36. 2600 News, The Hacker CSC Quarterly, available at http://www.2600.com (last vis-
ited Mar. 4, 2001).
37. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 308-09. The original defendants were Shawn Reimerdes,
Roman Kazan and Eric Corley. Defendants Reimerdes and Kazan both entered into consent
decrees with plaintiff. Id. at 312 n. 91. Plaintiffs subsequently amended their complaint to add
2600 Enterprises, Inc. as a defendant. Id. Identifying the defendant Eric Corley (who also goes
by the nom de plum "Emmanuel Goldstein" after a character in George Orwell's novel 1984) as
someone "viewed as a leader of the hacker community," the court described the defendants'
publication as "something of a bible to the hacker community." Id. at 308 (footnote omitted)
(citing trial transcript testimony of defendant Eric Corley, publisher of 2600: The Hacker
Quarterly). The court proceeded by describing some of the content of the magazine: "such topics
as how to steal an Internet domain name, intercept cellular calls, and break into the computer
system at Costco Stores and Federal Express." Id. at 308-09 (footnotes omitted).
38. A DVD is capable of holding over 4.7 gigabytes on a five inch plastic disc similar to a
compact disc (CD), which only holds approximately 650 megabytes. Id. at 307. DVDs are ideal
for movies, because they have enough storage space to contain feature length film in digital for-
mat. Digital content has the unique characteristic of allowing virtually infinite copies to be made
[Vol. 25:287
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called Content Scrambling System (CSS), which encrypts or scrambles
the digital content contained on a DVD.39 To view the content, a user
must use a DVD player or DVD drive with special software contain-
ing the decryption or descrambling key, which are encryption algo-
rithms that allow the player to unscramble the content, making it
viewable.4" CSS inhibits the duplication of DVDs to the extent that
those licensed to manufacture DVD players and drives are prohibited
from manufacturing equipment that produces a signal that could be
used to copy DVDs.41
In September of 1999, a Norwegian teenager named Jon
Johansen, along with two other unknown individuals, acquired the
CSS decryption keys by reverse-engineering a licensed DVD player.42
Using these keys, he developed a program called "DeCSS," which ef-
fectively decrypts a DVD, allowing a user to playback the DVD on an
unlicensed player or to copy it without any encryption or scrambling.43
DeCSS is a "Windows executable file," meaning it can be used only
on a computer operating in the Windows operating system environ-
ment.4" Once Johansen posted a copy of DeCSS on his personal web
site, it was quickly distributed and was made available on hundreds of
web sites on the Internet.4S
without any significant degradation in the quality of the audio and video content; a characteristic
that makes DVDs particularly attractive to copy. Id. at 309.
39. Id. CSS was developed cooperatively by Matsushita Electric Company and Toshiba
Corp. These companies granted a royalty-free license to the DVD Copy Control Association,
which in turn licenses the technology to both equipment manufacturers and the motion picture
studios. Id. at 310 n.60. For more detailed information on DVD copy protections systems, see
Jeffrey A. Bloom et al., Copy Protection for DVD Video, 87 PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE, No. 7,
1267 (July 1999), in which the authors state:
CSS is a low-cost method of scrambling MPEG-2 video, developed by Matsushita.
Descrambling requires a pair of keys. One of the keys is unique to the disk, while the
other is unique to the MPEG file [graphical and audio content] being descram-
bled.... The purpose of CSS is twofold. First and foremost, it prevents byte-for-
byte copies of an MPEG stream from being playable since such copies will not in-
clude the keys. Second, it provides a reason for manufacturers to make compliant de-
vices, since CSS scrambled disks will not play on noncompliant devices. Anyone
wishing to build compliant devices must obtain a license, which contains the require-
ment that the rest of the copy-protection system be implemented.
Id. at 1268.
40. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 309.
41. Id.at310.
42. Id. at 311. The term "keys" refers to a cryptographic algorithm that allows encrypted
media to be decrypted. In order to unlock the content of a DVD, the keys contained in the DVD
player must be applied to corresponding keys contained on the DVD, which would result in the
descrambling of the content.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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In November of the same year, the defendants began posting on
their web site a downloadable copy of DeCSS that they acquired on
the Internet.46 They also established a list of hyperlinks to other sites
that posted DeCSS.4 7 As a result, computer users could obtain a copy
of DeCSS, either by downloading it from the defendants' web site or
by clicking on a hyperlink on the site, which then transported them to
an unrelated web site, which might contain the program."
Once the plaintiffs became aware of the proliferation of DeCSS
on the Internet, they sent numerous letters to web site operators who
had posted DeCSS, demanding that they remove the program.4 9
When the letters failed to prompt the defendants' removal of DeCSS
from their site, the plaintiffs followed up on their threat and filed suit
in Federal District Court."0
As a result, the plaintiffs were granted a preliminary injunction
to bar the defendants from posting DeCSS on their web site."' Follow-
ing the injunction, the defendants ceased posting DeCSS on their web
46. Id. at 312.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. While this Note focuses on the Reimerdes case, the plaintiffs also brought suits against
several other individuals. The same plaintiffs brought suit against a defendant under the
DMCA in the Federal District Court for the District of Connecticut. Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Hughes, No. 300CV72RNC (filed Jan. 14, 2000). As of this writing, the Hughes case
does not appear to have gone beyond the pleading stage. The DVD Copy Control Association,
the licensing entity for CSS, also brought suit against an individual in California under state
trade secret law. DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. McLaughlin, No. CV 786804, 2000 WL 48512
(Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 21, 2000) (unpublished opinion granting preliminary injunction). The pro-
ceedings in McLaughlin are, as of this writing, stayed pending the decision by the California
Court of Appeals on the defendant's appeal of the preliminary injunction. For additional infor-
mation on these cases, see the Berkman Center's Open Law Project, Open DVD, available at
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/DVD/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2001).
51. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 222 (memorandum or-
der granting preliminary injunction). The court concluded that the plaintiffs had met the requi-
site requirements for a preliminary injunction and rejected the defendants' First Amendment
challenges to the DMCA as applied:
The computer code at issue in this case does little to serve (First Amendment) goals.
Although this Court has assumed that DeCSS has at least some expressive content,
the expressive aspect appears to be minimal when compared to its functional compo-
nent. Computer code primarily is a set of instructions which, when read by the com-
puter, cause it to function in a particular way, in this case, to render intelligible a data
file on a DVD. It arguably "is best treated as a virtual machine ....
Id. at 222 (quoting Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 708, 715-18 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (footnotes
omitted).
Against this minimal interest, the court juxtaposed the DMCA's value in complimenting the
instrumental benefits of copyright law. Id. Because of the unquestionable societal benefit served
by the DMCA and copyright law, and given that the posting of DeCSS appeared to be "part of a
course of action in clear violation of the law," the court found that whatever expressive element
DeCSS contained was outweighed by the governmental interest in suppressing it. Id. at 211.
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site, but continued to post the hyperlinks to other sites that purport-
edly posted copies of the program.12 Additionally, they urged Internet
users to download DeCSS at these other sites, 3 indicating that their
actions were an act of "electronic civil disobedience. '5 4
B. Findings of Fact
The court examined the actual process necessary to employ
DeCSS to decrypt a DVD.SS The decryption process takes 20 to 45
minutes, after which a user is left with between four to six gigabytes of
data.56 In order for that data to be transferable, the user must com-
press it using a compression utility. 7 Once compressed, the graphic
and sound files must be synchronized, a process that takes 10 to 20
hours.5 8 Despite the fact that the process is "computationally inten-
sive" and time consuming, the court found it to be "entirely feasi-
ble."5 9 The compression results in approximately 650 megabytes of
data, allowing the data to be transferred to a writeable CD-ROM.6"
More important in terms of dissemination, however, was the risk
that the decrypted movies, once compressed, could be easily trans-
ferred across the Internet. 61 The court found that, while a transmis-
sion of a complete movie may take as long as six hours because of the
immense amount of data, the transmission time could be cut, with
high speed access, to as little as three to twenty minutes.
The plaintiffs stipulated that they had no direct evidence of any
DeCSS-decrypted movie being transmitted across the Internet.63
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had been dam-
aged. 64 Because DeCSS is "a free, effective and fast means of decrypt-
52. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 312.
53. Id. at 313. On a banner on defendants' web site, they declared, "Stop the MPAA"
(Motion Picture Association of America), and stated, "We might have to face the possibility that
we could be forced into submission. For that reason it's especially important that as many of you
as possible, all throughout the world, take a stand and mirror these files." Id.
54. Id. at 303, 312.
55. Id. at 313.
56. Id.
57. Id. The court noted that "one solution" was to employ a compression utility called
"DivX." Movies compressed using the utility are commonly referred to as "DivXed Movies."
Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 314.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 314-15. The court noted that the plaintiffs' expert found a person on the Inter-
net willing to trade a copy of the movie The Matrix for a copy of Sleepless in Seattle. This fact,
however, begs the question as to whether the movies were even decrypted using DeCSS. As the
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ing plaintiffs' DVDs and copying them to computer hard drives," they
could then be copied on to writeable CD-ROM's or transmitted
across the Internet.6" Whether any actual infringement was attribut-
able to the defendants was irrelevant because, as the court noted, the
violation of the anti-trafficking provisions is not dependent on a show-
ing of actual infringement.66
According to the court, this potential for copying and piracy had
two implications. First, the court found the defendants' posting of
DeCSS to be equivalent to "publishing a bank vault combination in a
national newspaper" because it compromised the plaintiffs' copy pro-
tection system. 67 As long as DeCSS was available, the plaintiffs were
potentially faced with developing a new method of protecting their
movies in order to prevent greater levels of copying, obviously an ex-
pensive proposition.68  Second, the availability of DeCSS and its
capacity for making copies of plaintiffs' movies, which could then be
freely distributed, "threatened to reduce the studios' revenues" from
DVDs.69 Consequently, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had
already been "gravely injured."70
C. The Court's Statutory and Constitutional Analysis
The Reimerdes court was faced with a number of statutory and
constitutional issues. From the standpoint of statutory interpretation,
the first question is whether the defendants' posting of DeCSS consti-
tuted a violation of Section 1201 of the DMCA. If the posting consti-
tuted a violation, then the second question is whether the linking of
DeCSS to other sites was the equivalent of posting and thus consti-
tuted a violation as well. The court answered both questions in the af-
firmative.7 Further, as discussed below, the court also answered in
the affirmative the question as to whether the statute, both on its face
court noted previously, there were several other "ripper" programs available at the time that were
capable of decrypting DVDs, although apparently not as effective as DeCSS. Id. at 311.
65. Id. at 315.
66. Id.
67. Id. This finding raises an interesting question with respect to injunctive relief in this
instance. At the time, DeCSS was available at numerous other sites. Thus, barring the defen-
dants from posting it would have little effect in terminating its availability, except that it would
not be available via the defendants' web site. This is illustrated by the fact that the defendants
posted web site addresses in plain or non-hyperlink text following the final injunction, which
likely diluted significantly the efficacy of the injunction.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 325.
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and as applied, was valid under the Free Expression Clause of the
First Amendment.
1. Statutory Analysis
a. Section 1201(a)(2)
Section 1201(a)(2) prohibits manufacturing, providing, offering
or otherwise trafficking in any technology that facilitates the circum-
vention of a technological measure that effectively controls access to a
copyrighted work or protects the rights of a copyright holder against
unauthorized use of the work, such as copying.73 This so-called "anti-
trafficking" provision compliments the basic anti-circumvention pro-
vision by denying the means necessary to circuvmentcircumvent tech-
nological measures employed to control the access to or use of a copy-
righted work. 4
The defendants conceded to providing and offering DeCSS by
posting it on their web site and "absent a court order would continue
to offer and provide DeCSS to the public by making it available for
download on the 2600.com web site."7" The defendants argued, how-
ever, that because CSS was easily decrypted, it was not a technology
that "effectively" controlled access. 6 The court rejected this argu-
ment because the term "effectively," as used in this context, merely
required the input of some information or a process in order to gain
access to the work.77 The court then found that CSS was in fact a
technology that effectively controlled access to a copyrighted work,
72. Id. at 326, 341.
73. Id. at 316-17; 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (1998). This Section provides that
[n]o person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic
in any technology... that - (A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose
of... ; (B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than... ;
or (C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with
that person's knowledge for use in circumventing a technological measure that effec-
tively controls access to a work protected under [the Copyright Act].
This "anti-trafficking" provision in effect supplements the anti-circumvention provision by pro-
hibiting the dissemination of technology that may be used to gain unauthorized access to a copy-
righted work. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 18, § 12A.03[D][1]-[3]. The circumvention provision
is analogous to a statute prohibiting breaking and entering; the anti-trafficking provisions are the
equivalent to a law prohibiting burglar tools. See id.
74. Id.
75. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 317.
76. Id. As a computer program, DeCSS is clearly "technology within the meaning of the
statute." Id. Because DeCSS "clearly is a means of circumventing a technological access control
measure," the court concluded that if DeCSS is within the meaning of either Sub-paragraphs (A),
(B), or (C) of Section 1201(a)(2), and none of the statutory exemptions applies, the defendants
are in violation of the DMCA by posting DeCSS. Id.
77. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 318.
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even though it might have been only marginally effective in doing so. 78
Since the only function of DeCSS was to defeat DVD encryption, it
was designed primarily to circumvent CSS. 79 Thus, the plaintiffs es-
tablished a prima facie violation of Section 1201(a)(1)(A), unless one
or more of the statutory exceptions were applicable."0
The defendants asserted two related defenses against the applica-
tion of the DMCA that would prohibit their dissemination of DeCSS.
First, they asserted that their distribution of DeCSS fell within the re-
verse-engineering statutory exception. The contention is that the
purpose of DeCSS was to allow persons with computers running the
Linux operating system" to view DVDs on their computers.8 2 DeCSS
was necessary for this purpose, the defendants claimed, because there
were no Linux-compatible DVD players available at that time. In
light of this, they argued, the reverse-engineering exception8 3 to the
DMCA applied to the extent that DeCSS was intended to achieve in-
teroperability between DVDs and the Linux system.8 4 The court re-
78. Id. at 317-18. A contrary finding would possibly have lead to the conclusion that CSS
was not protected by Sections 1201(a)(1)(A)-(C). Id. In order to gain access to a DVD protected
by CSS, the user must apply the keys contained within a compliant player or drive. The court
found that rather than requiring the access control that provided a strong measure of protection,
the statute merely required the "application of information or a process or a treatment," which
CSS did. Id,
79. Id. at 318-19.
80. Id. at 319. The DMCA has several narrow statutory exceptions that exempt certain
conduct from the anti-circumvention provisions. Reverse-engineering to achieve interoperabil-
ity, good-faith encryption research, and security testing, see 17 U.S.C. § 1201(0, (g), were all con-
sidered and rejected by the court. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 319-21.
The court also concluded that because "the only purpose or use of DeCSS is to circumvent CSS,
the foregoing is sufficient to establish aprimafacie violation of Section 1201(a)(2)(B) as well. Id.
at 319. That subsection prohibits trafficking in any technology that "(B) has only limited com-
mercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent a technological measure that effec-
tively controls access to a work protected under the [Copyright Act]; . 17 U.S.C. §
1201(a)(2)(B).
81. The Linux operating system is an open source alternative to the ubiquitous Microsoft
Windows operating system. The term "open source" refers to the fact that the source code for
the operating system, unlike Windows, is transparent and may be manipulated and altered by
individual users. For more information on the Linux system, see generally, Jason Kroll, What is
Linux? LINUX J. (June 24, 1999), available at http://www.linuxjournal.com/about-linux/ (last
updated July 28, 1999) (last visited Mar. 6, 2001).
82. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 319.
83. At trial, the defendants claimed several statutory exemptions to the DMCA but, in
their post-trial brief, confined their claim to the reverse-engineering exemption. Id.
84. The defendants also claimed that the fair use exemption protected their activity on the
theory that DeCSS was developed to further the development of a DVD player that would run
under the Linux operating system, rather than to pirate DVDs. Because no Linux-compatible
DVD drive existed at the time DeCSS was developed, the defendants contended that the statu-
tory exemption under the DMCA for reverse-engineering and interoperability exempted them
from liability. The court, however, made short work of this argument. Even accepting the initial
premise of the defendants' argument as true (about which the court expressed some doubt), the
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jected this claim, noting that the defendants did not do any reverse-
engineering themselves, but rather simply posted a program created
by a third party." Moreover, even if they had actually created the
program, the exception would not have applied because the reverse-
engineering exception applies only to dissemination of technology"'solely for the purpose' of achieving interoperability . "... 86 Since
DeCSS was designed to run on the Windows operating system and
was capable of being used to decrypt DVDs, the defendants could not
claim that its "sole" purpose was to achieve interoperability.87
Related to the statutory defense was the defendants' claim that
the doctrine of fair use8 entitled them to disseminate DeCSS. The de-
fendants argued that because DeCSS might be capable of allowing
others to obtain access to copyrighted works for fair use purposes, the
Sony doctrine exempted the dissemination of DeCSS from the
DMCA.89 In Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,"0 the Supreme
defendants did not do any reverse-engineering by themselves. Moreover, because the sole pur-
pose of DeCSS was to circumvent access and use controls, the defendants would be liable for
trafficking in a prohibited technology, regardless of the ostensible reason why the software was
originally developed. Finally, even if the defendants had done the reverse-engineering, the court
suggested that the exemption would not apply because DeCSS was a Windows- executable file
not capable of running under Linux. The court raised and dismissed the defendants' earlier con-
tentions that their activity may have been exempted by virtue of the encryption or security test-
ing exemptions, finding them either abandoned by the defendants or clearly inapplicable. Id. at
319-21.
85. Id. at 319
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. The fair use doctrine is codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1995).
89. Access and use controls can have the effect of inhibiting fair use to the extent that they
must be circumvented in order for one to gain access to engage in the fair use activity. Because
fair use is by definition not infringement, circumvention of access or use controls in order to
make fair use would not be an infringing activity.
The defendants argued that the DMCA could not reasonably be construed to prohibit the
dissemination of DeCSS and other circumvention technology because to do so would be to deny
in large part the ability of the public to engage in legitimate fair use activities. Moreover, the
defendants also argued, DeCSS was capable of significant use other than the infringement of
copyrighted materials. This argument was based on the "substantial non-infringing use" rule of
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). In Sony, the Supreme Court held
that the manufacturer of the Betamax video tape recorder was not contributorily liable for copy-
right infringement, even though the recorders could be used to make illegal copies of copyrighted
television programming. Id. at 456-57. The case stands for the proposition that manufacturers
of an article of commerce are exempt from claims of contributory infringement if the article is
capable of substantial non-infringing use.
While the Reimerdes court acknowledged that encryption technology may affect the ability to
make fair use of DVDs and other digital content in some instances, it found that Congress struck
a balance among competing interests by providing sufficient safe harbors for certain activities
that would otherwise be considered infringing. 111 F. Supp. 2d at 323-24. The court reasoned
that the fair use doctrine was applicable only as a defense to infringement, and because the de-
fendants were being sued for offering circumvention technology, the doctrine was inapplicable.
Id. at 324. In fact, the court stated that lack of an express inclusion of a fair use defense in Sec-
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Court held that the manufacturer of a product allegedly used by con-
sumers to engage in copyright infringement was exempt from claims
of contributory copyright infringement if the product was capable of
substantial non-infringing use, such as making limited personal cop-
ies.91 Although the Reimerdes court acknowledged that copyright
management systems such as CSS had the potential to restrict an indi-
vidual's ability to engage in fair use, the court rejected the defendants'
argument. First, the court noted that Sony was inapplicable to viola-
tions of the DMCA because the conduct at issue was trafficking in cir-
cumvention technology, not contributory copyright infringement.92
Second, noting that Congress had explicitly excluded the Sony doc-
trine from Section 1201, the court stated that Sony was overruled to
the extent it was inconsistent with the DMCA.93 Thus, a device or
technology capable of having a substantial non-infringing use, while
exempt from a contributory infringement claim under Sony, can nev-
ertheless violate the anti-trafficking provisions for its circumvention
capability.
b. Linking to Other Sites With DeCSS
The court, after finding that posting DeCSS constituted a viola-
tion of the DMCA, addressed the issue of whether linking to another
site constituted offering, providing or otherwise trafficking in DeCSS
within the meaning of Chapter 12 of the DMCA.94 The plaintiffs' re-
quest for an injunction to prohibit the defendants from linking to
DeCSS stemmed "in no small part from what the defendants them-
selves have termed their act of 'electronic civil disobedience'-their
attempt to defeat the purpose of the preliminary injunction .... ),,
tion 1201 was evidence that Congress decided not to include such a defense under the statute.
Id.
The court went as far to say that a device could be exempt from contributory infringement
under the Sony test but could still be in violation, declaring that Sony "has been overruled by the
later enactment of the DMCA to the extent that any inconsistency between Sony and the new
statute." Id. at 323. The court rejected the defendants' assertion that Sony immunized them
from liability because DeCSS might possibly be used for non-infringing purposes. The court
stated that while a device or technology with a substantial non-infringing use may be exempted
under Sony from contributory infringement, it could still be subject to suppression under Section
1201 because the DMCA had "fundamentally altered the [copyright] landscape." Id. at 319.
90. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
91. Id. at 442.
92. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 323-24.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 324.
95. Id. In fact, at the close of the preliminary injunction hearing, the plaintiffs requested
that the injunction be extended to prevent the defendants from linking. The court denied their
request because they had not raised the issue in their pleadings. Id at 312.
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Interpreting the plain language of the statute with the aid of a
dictionary,96 the court determined that "the anti-trafficking provision
of the DMCA is implicated where one presents, holds out or makes a
circumvention technology or device available, knowing its nature, for
the purpose of allowing others to acquire it."97
The court identified three basic categories of hyperlinks that the
defendants used to link to other sites with DeCSS.98 Links in the first
category, when clicked, resulted in the automatic download of the pro-
gram.99 Those in the second category sent the user to a third party's
web page containing nothing other than DeCSS. °° The third category
links took the user to a web page or site containing substantial content
in addition to DeCSS. 101
The court held that the first category links were "the functional
equivalent of transferring the DeCSS code to the user themselves. '"102
Similarly, the court found no substantial difference between a hyper-
link that takes a person from the defendants' web site to a page con-
taining nothing more than the DeCSS code and that offering no other
option than to download the software. To the extent that the defen-
dants linked to sites with knowledge and intent to make DeCSS avail-
able, they effectively provided or otherwise trafficked in DeCSS.° 3
Links to sites with content other than DeCSS, however, pre-
sented a somewhat closer question for the court. With respect to this
type of link, the court stated that linking to a web site that incidentally
made DeCSS available, without more, would not necessarily subject
the linking party to liability.14 The court illustrated the problem with
the following hypothetical:
If one assumed, for the purposes of argument, that the Los
Angeles Times web site somewhere contained the DeCSS
code, it would be wrong to say that anyone who linked to the
Los Angeles Times web site, regardless of purpose or the
manner in which the link was described, thereby offered,
provided or otherwise trafficked in DeCSS merely because
96. Id. at 325 ("To 'traffic' in something is to engage in dealings with it ... [and] to 'pro-
vide' something, in the sense of the statute, is to make it available or furnish it .... To 'offer' is
to present or hold it out for consideration.").
97. Id.
98. Id. at 324-25.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 325.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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DeCSS happened to be available on a site to which one
linked. "'
In the court's view, the defendants did much more than linking
to a site that incidentally contained DeCSS. The defendants encour-
aged other sites to post DeCSS for the purpose of distributing it and
took steps to verify that the sites they linked to were in fact posting
it. 10 6 These actions, according to the court, elevated the defendants'
linking to the level of providing or trafficking in DeCSS. 117
2. First Amendment Challenges
Having concluded that the defendants' conduct fell within the
activities proscribed by the DMCA, the court turned to address the
defendants' constitutional claims. The defendants raised two princi-
pal arguments against the DMCA's application to the dissemination
of DeCSS. First, they argued that the DeCSS source and object code
was "protected speech" and as a result, the application of the Act's
anti-trafficking provisions constituted a violation of their First
Amendment right to free expression.10 Second, they contended that
the imposition of an injunction preventing their linking to other web
sites posting DeCSS constituted a further violation of the Amendment
to the extent that hypertext links constitute speech.109
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. . . ."1 This
language has been interpreted as providing "that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its sub-
ject matter, or its content."'' 1  Thus, as a general matter, restrictions
on speech are separated into two categories: content-based and con-
tent-neutral restrictions. Content-based regulations seek either to
limit expression based on the message or because of the effect of the
message, while content-neutral regulations limit speech incidentally in
pursuance of other goals unrelated to the content of the speech."'
105. Id. In support of this proposition, the court cites to DVD Copy Control Ass'n v.
McLaughlin, No. CV 786804, 2000 WL 48512, at *4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 21, 2000), a state
trade secret misappropriation case brought against another defendant who posted DeCSS. The
court's use of this case is somewhat ironic, however, because the McLaughlin court refused to
grant an injunction barring linking. Id. at *4.
106. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 324-25.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 325.
109. Id. at 339.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
111. Police Dep't of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (citations omitted).
112. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 789-90
(2d ed. 1988).
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With certain well-defined exceptions, content-based restrictions are
invalid under the First Amendment unless upon a showing that they
serve a compelling governmental interest and are narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest in the "least restrictive means possible," a stan-
dard commonly referred to as "strict scrutiny.""..3 In contrast, a con-
tent-neutral limitation on speech is generally upheld if it "furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest" that is not related to
the "suppression of free expression" and does so in a manner that is
not unduly restrictive upon speech." 4
a. The DMCA's Prohibition of the Dissemination of DeCSS
There was no dispute that the injunction in the Reimerdes case
required some level of First Amendment scrutiny. As stated by the
court, "It cannot seriously be argued that any form of computer code
may be regulated without reference to First Amendment doctrine. '
Computer code, in addition to being a series of binary instructions to a
computer, is a means of expressing ideas. Because the First Amend-
ment has been expanded to cover virtually all modes of expression,
any regulation of computer code must be evaluated in the context of
the First Amendment. 116
However, the court did not agree that the First Amendment
automatically erected a barrier against the Section 1201(a)(2) anti-
trafficking provisions." 7 As an initial matter, the court had to decide
the level of constitutional scrutiny applicable to the statute." 8 As dis-
cussed, content-based regulations are reviewed under "strict scrutiny,"
whereas their content-neutral counterparts are reviewed on a lesser
standard called "intermediate scrutiny.""' 9
In order to survive strict scrutiny, content-based restrictions on
speech must "serve compelling state interests in the least restrictive
means available."'' 2 In contrast, under the intermediate scrutiny test,
121as pronounced by the Supreme Court in United States v. O'Brien,
113. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664-65 (1994).
114. Id.
115. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 326.
116. Id. at 327 (citing Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000) (other citations
omitted).
117. Id. at 332.
118. See id. at 327 (quoting Police Dep't of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96
(1972), for the proposition that "[iun general, 'government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content ... .
119. Id. at 328.
120. Id. at 327 (footnote omitted) (citing Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. F.C.C.,
492 U.S. 115 (1989); Turner Broad. Sys. Inc., v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622 (1994)).
121. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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content-neutral restrictions "will be upheld if they serve a substantial
governmental interest and restrict First Amendment freedoms no
more than necessary." '122 In general, "[r]estrictions on the nonspeech
elements of expressive conduct fall into the conduct-neutral cate-
gory." ''  Because DeCSS contains both expressive and functional,
nonspeech elements, the question was whether Section 1201(a)(2) tar-
geted the expressive content of DeCSS or was principally aimed at
proscribing the functional, nonspeech elements while incidentally re-
stricting expression. 124
The court found that the DMCA "had nothing to do with the
suppression of speech and everything to do with.., preventing people
from circumventing technological access control measures ... 12
DeCSS, like any computer code, has both expressive and non-
expressive, functional elements. The court reasoned that the DMCA,
as applied to the posting of DeCSS, was a content-neutral restriction
on speech because it primarily restricted the nonspeech, functional
elements of the program and only incidentally restricted any of its ex-
pressive elements. 126  The court went on to state, however, that the"particular functional characteristics" of DeCSS were "such that the
Court would apply the same level of scrutiny even if it were viewed as
content based. 127
Content-neutral restrictions on speech are upheld if they serve a
substantial or important governmental interest without any unneces-
sary restriction on free speech. 2 ' The court held that the DMCA's
goal of protecting copyrighted works was a substantial governmental
interest in light of the constitutional mandate for copyright protec-
tion129 and the importance of the copyright industry to the national
122. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 327.
123. Id. at 328.
124. See id. at 327-28. Because of the constitutional distinction "between pure speech,
which ordinarily receives the highest level of protection, and expressive conduct," incidental re-
strictions upon expression may be justified by a substantial governmental interest in regulating
the nonexpressive activity. Id. "The critical point is that nonspeech elements may create haz-
ards for society above and beyond speech elements," making them "subject to regulation in ap-
propriate circumstances because the government has an interest in dealing with the potential
hazards of the nonspeech elements despite the fact that they are joined with expressive ele-
ments." Id.
125. Id. at 329.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 332-33. The court cites R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83
(1992), in support of this proposition, noting that some categories of speech may be regulated on
the basis of their content, e.g., obscenity and fighting words.
128. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 328.
129. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 reads, "To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec-
tive Writings and Discoveries .... "
[Vol. 25:287
The Freedom to Link?
economy. 3 ° Moreover, the prohibition of disseminating circumven-
tion software as a means of providing copyright protection was viewed
by the court as accomplishing its objective without infringing on the
right of expression any more than necessary.' The court thus con-
cluded that the DMCA as applied to prohibit the posting of DeCSS
was a content-neutral regulation serving a substantial governmental
interest without restricting speech any more than necessary.'32 The
court qualified this holding, however, by stating that the holding was
"limited (1) to programs that circumvent access controls to copy-
righted works in digital form in circumstances in which (2) there is no
other practical means of preventing infringement through use of the
programs, and (3) the regulation is motivated by a desire to prevent
performance of the function for which the programs exist rather than
any message they might convey."' 33
b. Prior Restraint
The court next turned to the defendants' argument that the in-
junction prohibiting the dissemination of DeCSS constituted a prior
restraint of speech. "Few phrases are as firmly rooted in our constitu-
tional jurisprudence as the maxim that '[a]ny system of prior restraints
of expression comes to [a] court bearing a heavy presumption against
its constitutional validity."" 34 A prior restraint occurs when limita-
tions are placed on speech prior to its publication, as opposed to sub-
sequent punishment imposed upon the speaker through fines or im-
prisonment.135 In spite of this proclamation, the court found that
enjoining the defendants from disseminating DeCSS was not barred
by the prior restraint doctrine.'36 The court distinguished the case at
bar from "classic prior restraint cases" on the grounds that in the latter
cases, "the government sought to suppress speech at the very heart of
the First Amendment concern--expression about public issues of the
sort that is indispensable to self government."' 37 The court stated that
130. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 329.
131. Id. at 329.
132. Id. at 332.
133. Id. at 333.
134. Id. (quoting United States v. Washington Post Co., 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971)).
135. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 1616, at
1019-1020 (5th ed. 1995).
136. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 333-34.
137. Id. at 334-35 (citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (an injunction abating
scandalous and defamatory newspapers); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)
(injunction barring the publication of internal government history of Vietnam War); Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (court order against publication of details of pending
murder case)).
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it would be a mistake to equate the expressive elements of DeCSS with
the New York Times' publication of the Pentagon Papers13 "without
a more nuanced consideration of the competing concerns. "139
The court held that "the considerations supporting an injunc-
tion" against the dissemination of DeCSS were "very substantial in-
deed." 4 Because the "broad dissemination of DeCSS threatens ulti-
mately to injure or destroy [the] plaintiffs' ability to" distribute and
sell their products, "the potential damages are incalculable." '' On the
other side of the equation, the court found very little constitutional
value in the dissemination of DeCSS. "The presence of some expres-
sive content. . . should not obscure the fact" that DeCSS is primarily
functional, with only minimal expressive characteristics.4 Because
the "enjoined expressive element" of DeCSS was minimal, the court
held that the prior restraint doctrine did not prevent an injunction
against its dissemination. 43
The court also rejected the defendants' argument that the statu-
tory prohibition on disseminating circumvention technology was un-
constitutionally overbroad. The defendants' overbreadth claim rested
on the assertion that the injunction deprived others of the ability to
make lawful fair use of encrypted works. 144 While the court acknowl-
edged that the fair use with respect to DVDs was affected by the
DMCA, it found those effects to be trivial in degree. To the extent
that those concerns existed, however, the court held that the affected
parties, not the defendants, may bring the overbreadth challenge. 4 '
138. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 334-35. The New York Times obtained certain De-
partment of Defense documents regarding the Vietnam War entitled "History of U.S. Decision
Making Process on Vietnam Policy," documents that portrayed the government's involvement in
the war in a very unfavorable light. The government requested that the Times not publish the
papers and demanded their return. The Supreme Court ultimately held that that the govern-
ment could not constitutionally suppress the publication of the papers. N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at
713-14.
139. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 336 (referring to N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 713).
140. Id. at 335.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 336.
144. Id.
145. Interestingly, a California Superior Court, in granting a preliminary injunction in a
similar DeCSS case brought under state trade secret law, refused to extend injunctive relief to
prohibit linking, citing concerns of overbreadth. See DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v.
McLaughlin, No. CV 786804, 2000 WL 48512, at *4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 21, 2000) (unpub-
lished order granting preliminary injunction). The DVD Copy Control Association, the licensor
of CSS, brought a trade secret misappropriation action against defendants for posting and linking
to sites containing DeCSS in a manner similar to the defendants in Reimerdes. Id. In refusing to
extend injunctive relief to bar linking to sites with DeCSS, the court stated, "the Court refuses to
issue an injunction against linking to other websites which contain the protected materials as
such an order is overbroad and extremely burdensome. Links to other websites are the mainstay
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The court also quickly dismissed the defendants' assertion that
Section 1201(a)(2) was unconstitutionally vague. Finding that there
can be "no serious doubt" that the defendants' posting of DeCSS con-
stituted "an offer to the public of technology primarily designed for
the purpose of circumventing [the plaintiffs'] access control system,"
which clearly violated the DMCA, the court held that the defendants
would "not be heard to complain of any vagueness as applied to oth-
ers." 146
c. The Prohibition of Linking to Sites With DeCSS
As with computer code generally, hyperlinks "have both expres-
sive and functional elements. "147 In light of this, the court reasoned
that the constitutional propriety of enjoining the defendants from link-
ing to other sites with DeCSS was governed by the intermediate scru-
tiny standard.'48 The court found that each prong of the intermediate
scrutiny test was met with respect to the prohibition against linking. 149
First, the prohibition against linking to sites with DeCSS satisfied the
content-neutrality prong because, in the court's view, the "regulation
of the linking" was unrelated to the suppression of speech in the same
way that the prohibition on posting DeCSS was. 5 ° Second, the prohi-
bition against linking served the important governmental interest of
protecting digital works from circumvention, since the "[d]efendants'
posting and their linking amount to very much the same thing. '
However, the third prong, "whether the 'regulation promotes a sub-
stantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively ab-
sent the regulation,"' was "a somewhat closer call.'1 5 2
Rather than enjoining the defendants from linking to other sites
with DeCSS, the plaintiffs could alternatively proceed directly against
those other sites to force them to take down the copies of DeCSS.
This option was arguably more effective than the injunction against
linking. However, the "real significance" of the anti-linking injunc-
of the Internet and indispensable to its convenient access to the vast world of information. A
website owner cannot be held responsible for all of the content of the sites to which it provides
links. Further, an order prohibiting linking to websites with prohibited information is not neces-
sary since the Court has enjoined the posting of the information in the first instance. Nothing in
this Order shall prohibit discussion, comment or criticism, so long as the proprietary information
identified above is not disclosed or distributed." Id.
146. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 339.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).
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tion was not with domestic, but with overseas sites, which were possi-
bly beyond the jurisdictional reach of the DMCA.5 3 Apparently find-
ing that an anti-linking injunction would frustrate attempts to access
these overseas web sites, the court held that the imposition of the in-
junction met the third prong of the intermediate scrutiny test as
well. "4
Finally, the court addressed the concerns about the potential
chilling effect that an injunction against linking might create. The
court recognized the importance that hyperlinks play in the
fundamental function and utility of the Internet:
[Hyperlinks] often are used in ways that do a great deal to
promote the free exchange of ideas and information that is a
central value of our nation. Anything that would impose
strict liability on a web site operator for the entire contents of
any web site to which the operator linked therefore would
raise grave constitutional concerns, as web site operators
would be inhibited from linking for fear of exposure to liabil-
ity. And it is equally clear that exposing those who use links
to liability under the DMCA might chill their use, as some
web site operators confronted with claims that they have
posted circumvention technology falling within the statute
may be more inclined to remove the allegedly offending link
rather than test the issue in court. Moreover, web sites often
contain a great variety of things, and a ban on linking to a site
that contains DeCSS amidst other content threatens to re-
strict communication of this information to an excessive de-
gree. 1s
Although the court recognized the potential chilling effect that an
injunction barring linking would have, it found that this concern was
not "unique to the issue of linking."' 6 The court analogized to the
potential chilling effect that defamation suits have on the press.17
"Just as the potential chilling effect of defamation suits has not utterly
immunized the press" from liability for defamation, the potential
chilling effect cannot prevent application of the anti-circumvention
provisions to linking."' 8 The solution was to establish a standard suf-
ficiently high to exempt all instances except those "in which the con-
153. Id. at 340.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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duct in question has little or no redeeming constitutional value."' 9
Again, borrowing from the defamation jurisprudence, the court held:
[T]here may be no injunction against, nor liability for, link-
ing to a site containing circumvention technology, the offer-
ing of which is unlawful under the DMCA, absent clear and
convincing evidence that those responsible for the link (a)
know at the relevant time that the offending material is on the
linked-to site, (b) know that it is circumvention technology
that may not lawfully be offered, and (c) create or maintain
the link for the purpose of disseminating that technology.
Such a standard will limit the fear of liability on the part of
web site operators just as the New York Times standard gives
the press great comfort in publishing all sorts of material that
would have been actionable at comriion law, even in the face
of flat denials by the subjects of their stories. And it will not
subject web site operators to liability for linking to a site con-
taining proscribed technology where the link exists for pur-
poses other than dissemination of that technology. 6 '
The court found that the plaintiffs demonstrated such clear and
convincing evidence. First, the court found that the defendants linked
to the third party sites with the knowledge that those sites contained
DeCSS.'' Additionally, the defendants did so with the full knowledge
that DeCSS was a circumvention device, which in light of their experi-
ence at trial caused them to know that their linking to such sites vio-
lated the DMCA. 162  Finally, the court found that they maintained
such links to thwart the effectiveness of the original injunction. 63
Thus, because the defendants knew that that DeCSS was a circumven-
tion device proscribed by the DMCA and because the defendants
posted and linked to DeCSS with the intent to disseminate DeCSS to
enable others to circumvent technological access control measures, the
court concluded that "[a]n anti-linking injunction does no violence to
the First Amendment.' ' 64
159. Id. The court referred to the "public official" standard set forth in N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), where the Supreme Court established the rule under which a pub-
lic official defamation plaintiff must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant
published a statement "with knowledge of falsity or serious doubt as to its truth." Id.
160. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d. at 341.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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3. The Remedy
Section 1203 of the DMCA provides, inter alia, that "[a]ny per-
son injured by a violation of section 1201 ... may bring a civil action
in an appropriate United States court for such violation." '165 The de-
fendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to meet the injury require-
ment for three reasons. First, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs
failed to introduce evidence proving that any decrypted movies were
actually available, a fact that the plaintiffs actually stipulated to. 166
The court rejected this contention by holding that the plaintiffs were
required to show merely the threat of injury caused by a violation of
the statute, rather than actual injury. 67 The court concluded that the
threat of piracy posed by the existence of DeCSS represented "a clear
threat of injury. , 168
Second, the defendants asserted that the real threat posed by
DeCSS was exaggerated by the plaintiffs, who actually believed that
DeCSS presented a minimal threat to their interests. However, be-
cause this contention was based merely on a couple of statements
made by the plaintiffs in an effort to "'spin' public opinion," the court
found that such statements were not an accurate representation of the
plaintiffs' actual belief on the matter.'69
Finally, the defendants claimed that to the extent that decrypted
movies may exist, no evidence was adduced at trial that they were ac-
tually decrypted using DeCSS. The defendants claimed that there
were other software utilities available that were equally or more effec-
tive at decrypting DVDs than DeCSS. While the court acknowledged
that other DVD "ripping" programs were available, it concluded that
DeCSS, as "the superior product," was more capable of decrypting
DVDs than the competing software. 7 ' In a footnote, the court noted
that the defendants' argument would fail even if there was credible
evidence supporting their contention that DeCSS was an inferior al-
ternative because the defendants were nevertheless liable under the
doctrine of joint liability as set forth in Summers v. Tice. 7'
165. 17 U.S.C. § 1203(a).
166. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 342.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. The doctrine of alternative liability set forth in Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal.
1948), holds that where two or more defendants are negligent, and one, and only one, caused in-
jury to the plaintiff but it is unclear which one was the actual cause, the burden of proof shifts to
the plaintiffs to individually disprove their liability. See also 1 CAL. CIV. PRAC. TORTS § 1:32
(1992) (explaining application of the Summers doctrine).
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Where, as here, two or more persons take substantially identical
wrongful actions, one and only one of which had to be the source
of the plaintiffs' injury, and it is equally likely that one inflicted
the injury as the other, the burden of proof on causation shifts to
the defendants, each of which is liable absent proof that its ac-
tion did not cause the injury. 72
Having found that the injury element of the statute was met, the
court turned to fashioning an appropriate remedy. The DMCA pro-
vides that the court may, in addition to actual and statutory damages,
impose injunctive relief if doing so is reasonably necessary to prevent
or restrain violations of the Act's provisions."' Generally, injunctive
relief is appropriate when there is a substantial likelihood of future
violations and "the plaintiff lacks an adequate remedy at law." 74 The
court found that both elements were met. First, the defendants dem-
onstrated their propensity for continuing to disseminate DeCSS, in
spite of the preliminary injunction imposed prior to trial to prevent
them from posting DeCSS. 75 Moreover, the court found that the
plaintiffs had no adequate remedy at law because the actual damages
to the plaintiff were incalculable. The court also found that statutory
damages did not provide adequate relief because such damages were
172. Id. n.267. It is doubtful, however, if the facts of the case really apply to the rule set
forth by the court. To the extent decrypted movies are available, it follows that some device or
program must have been used to decrypt the movie, assuming the source of the movie was a
DVD. However, it by no means follows that "one and only one [of the available utilities] had to
be the source of the plaintiffs' injury" because, in fact, it is just as likely that some or all of the
decrypting utilities contributed to the creation of decrypted movies. Moreover, the Summers
doctrine merely shifts the burden of persuasion and still requires joinder of each defendant re-
sponsible for the plaintiffs injury. See CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CIVIL, BOOK OF
APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CA BAJI 3.80 (8th ed. 1994).
173. 17 U.S.C. § 1203.
174. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 343.
175. Id. The court found that:
In this case, it is quite likely that defendants, unless enjoined, will continue to violate
the Act. Defendants are in the business of disseminating information to assist hackers
in "cracking" various types of technological security systems. And while defendants
argue that they promptly stopped posting DeCSS when enjoined preliminarily from
doing so, thus allegedly demonstrating their willingness to comply with the law, their
reaction to the preliminary injunction in fact cuts the other way. Upon being enjoined
from posting DeCSS themselves, defendants encouraged others to "mirror" the in-
formation-that is, to post DeCSS-and linked their own web site to mirror sites in
order to assist users of defendants' web site in obtaining DeCSS despite the injunction
barring defendants from providing it directly. While there is no claim that this activ-
ity violated the letter of the preliminary injunction, and it therefore presumably was
not contumacious, and while its status under the DMCA was somewhat uncertain, it
was a studied effort to defeat the purpose of the preliminary injunction. In conse-
quence, the Court finds that there is a substantial likelihood of future violations ab-
sent injunctive relief.
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assessed at $2,500 per each offer of the offending technology and it
would be next to impossible to determine what constituted an individ-
ual "offer." '176
On the above basis, the court broadly enjoined and restrained the
defendants from disseminating any technology that violated § 1201
and granted declaratory relief, stating that the defendants' "posting of
DeCSS on an Internet web site and knowing linking to other Internet
web sites containing DeCSS for the purpose of disseminating DeCSS
violated the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201 et
seq. ,177
IV. ANALYSIS
The purpose of this section is to analyze the application of the
DMCA to prohibit the posting of, and linking to, computer programs
such as DeCSS. Part A examines the First Amendment implications
of applying the DMCA to prohibit the posting of DeCSS. Part B then
addresses the free speech implications of an injunction barring linking
to other DeCSS-containing sites. This section concludes that the in-
junction requiring the removal of DeCSS from the defendants' site is
probably correct in light of the First Amendment jurisprudence but
that the DMCA, as applied to prohibit linking to other DeCSS-
containing sites, impermissibly infringes upon the right to free expres-
sion.
A. The Prohibition Against Posting DeCSS
This part first looks at the impact of the Reimerdes decision on
traditional notions of fair use. It then examines the First Amendment
concerns attending the suppression of DeCSS. Finally, this part con-
cludes that the DMCA, as applied in the Reimerdes case, places un-
warranted restrictions on fair use and free expression, arguing for a fair
use "exception" to the trafficking provisions.
1. Fair Use
Although the court noted that the defendants raised "a signifi-
cant point" with respect to the impact of copy control technology and
the DMCA on fair use, with a more complete statutory analysis, it
might have reached a different conclusion as to the constitutionality of
the DMCA as applied. First, the court found that CSS was an "access
control" under Section 1201(a)(2) rather than a "use control" under
176. Id. at 343-44.
177. Id. at 346-47.
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Section 1201(b)(1).'78 This is questionable, however, because CSS is
primarily designed to prevent copying, i.e., use, not unauthorized ac-
cess. Second, the court neglected to consider the impact of Section
1201(c)(1), which states, "Nothing in this section shall affect rights,
remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including
fair use, under [the Copyright Act]." '179
Fair use, along with the idea-expression dichotomy, is viewed as
essential to balance the tension between copyright and free expression.
This tension arises from the limited monopoly granted to copyright
holders. Copyright protection, rather than a mere means for authors
to acquire wealth, is intended to benefit the public by operating as
"the engine of free expression.""18 Copyright accomplishes this goal;
by "establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression,
copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate
ideas." 8 At the same time, however, copyright restricts free expres-
sion to the extent that one is barred from copying or otherwise using
the mode of expression copyrighted by another.'82
The idea-expression dichotomy dictates that only modes of ex-
pression, not the underlying ideas contained within that expression,
receive copyright protection so that facts and ideas remain in the pub-
lic domain. 83 Fair use complements this idea-expression dichotomy
by exempting from copyright infringement certain limited uses of
copyrighted works that would otherwise constitute infringement. 84
Once a common law doctrine, fair use is now codified within Section
107 of the Copyright Act.18 Traditional fair use activities include
copying for "criticism, comment, news reporting, [and] teaching,' 186
as well as limited copying for personal use.87 Another example of fair
use is making back-up copies of computer software. 8 Because the
potential applications constituting fair use are limited only by human
imagination, the doctrine employs a facts-and-circumstances test
178. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(2).
179. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1).
180. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
181. Id.
182. See Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellec-
tual Property Cases, 14 DUKE L.J. 147, 165-66 (1998).
183. Id. at 556; see also 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, § 1.10[B][2] (2001).
184. See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.05,
at 13-151-13-152 (2001).
185. Id.
186. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
187. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984) (holding
that using a VCR to make non-commercial copies for personal use was fair use).
188. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
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rather than a bright-line rule."8 9 In addition to the exemptions af-
forded to certain uses, traditional copyright law also provides a safe
harbor for the manufacturers of devices that can be used for infringing
purposes but have substantial non-infringing uses.19°
The DMCA has altered this traditional paradigm by limiting the
technology that facilitates fair use. As noted earlier, there are three
key provisions in Section 1201 relating to circumvention. First, Sec-
tion 1201(a)(1) prohibits the circumvention of technological measures
that control access to copyrighted works. This Section only applies to
the circumvention of access control technology and "is inapplicable to
'the subsequent actions of a person once he or she has obtained au-
thorized access to a copy of a work protected by [the Copyright Act],
even if such actions involve circumvention .... '191 Second, Section
1201(a)(2) supplements the anti-circumvention provision by making it
unlawful to traffic in any technology that facilitates the circumvention
of access controls. The legislative history indicates that Congress in-
tended these provisions to apply "when a person has not obtained au-
thorized access to a copy or a phonorecord of a work for which the
copyright owner has put in place a technological measure that ... con-
trols access to [the] work.11 2
Third, Section 1201(b)(1), in contrast, proscribes trafficking in
any technology that circumvents a technological measure that "pro-
tects a right of a copyright owner under [the Copyright Act] in a work
or a portion thereof ... .""' The difference between the first two pro-
visions and the third one is that "an individual would not be able to
circumvent in order to gain unauthorized access to a work" but could
circumvent encryption "in order to make fair use of a work which he
or she has acquired lawfully."' 94 Thus, it is not unlawful to circum-
vent a use control technological measure to engage in fair use, but it is
189. 17 U.S.C. § 107. This Section provides, "In determining whether the use made of a
work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include --(1) the pur-
pose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-
profit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substan-
tiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." Id.
190. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 455.
191. 3 NIMMER, supra note 18, § 12A.03[D][2], at 12A-34-12A-35.
192. Congress characterized the circumvention of an access control as being "the electronic
equivalent of breaking into a locked room in order to obtain a copy of a book." Id. §
12A.03[D][1], at 12A-29 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, at 17 (1998)).
193. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1).
194. 3 NIMMER, supra note 18, § 12A.06[C], at 12A-89 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 105-551,
at 18 (1998)).
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unlawful for anyone to traffic in technology that facilitates such cir-
cumvention. 9 '
The court concluded that DeCSS fell within the prohibitions un-
der Section 1201(a)(2). However, CSS does not fit neatly into the
category of an access control measure, because although it nominally
restricts access by requiring playback on a compliant player, the pri-
mary purpose of CSS is to prevent copying.196 An access control pre-
vents a user from gaining unauthorized access to a work in the first in-
stance.'97 For example, one cannot access the copyrighted materials in
the Westlaw or Lexis databases without first obtaining a password
from the data providers.
In contrast, CSS prevents copying by encrypting the content of
DVDs so that they can be played only on "compliant devices" that do
not produce a signal capable of being copied. Although "access" to a
DVD is restricted to the extent that it cannot be viewed on a noncom-
pliant DVD player, authorized access to the DVD itself can be ob-
tained by purchasing or renting a DVD in general. The only reason
for limiting playback of DVDs to compliant DVD players is to inhibit
copying. Therefore, in substance, if not in form, CSS is very similar
to a use control mechanism and Section 1201(b)(1), not Section
1201(a)(2), is applicable.
Had the court applied Section 1201(b)(1) instead of Section
1201(a)(2), the outcome might have been different because the nega-
195. See id. § 12A.03[D][3], at 12A-36-12A-37.
196. However, even if CSS is an access control measure in form, it is a use control mecha-
nism in substance. This is consistent with Nimmer's commentary, where he states, "Given the
stark contrast in how the two paragraphs are drafted, it would be improper for a court to construe
§ 1201 to bar the unenumerated behavior of one who engages solely in prohibited usage of a work
to which he has lawful access. That is the function, instead, of traditional copyright law. To the
extent that that individual capitalizes on his success, however, by offering comparable services to
the public, at that point he incurs liability under [Section 1201(b)(2)]." Id., § 12A.03[D][3], at
12A-38 n.187.
197. See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 17 (1998). The committee report indicates the
ban on circumvention of access controls and technology that facilitates such circumvention ap-
plies "when a person has not obtained authorized access to a copy or a phonorecord of a work for
which the copyright owner has put in place a technological measure that ... controls access to
[the] work." Id. (emphasis added). In another section, the report states, "to protect the owner,
copyrighted works will most likely be encrypted and made available to consumers once payment
is made for access to a copy of the work. Id. at 10 (emphasis added). Moreover, recognizing the
potential fair use implications, the committee stated "that Paragraph (a)(1) does not apply to the
subsequent actions of a person once he or she has obtained authorized access to a copy of a work
protected under Title 17, even if such actions involve circumvention of additional forms of techno-
logical protection measures. In a fact situation where the access is authorized, the traditional de-
fenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, would be fully applicable. So, an individual
would not be able to circumvent in order to gain unauthorized access to a work, but would be
able to do so in order to make fair use of a work which he or she has acquired lawfully." Id. at 18
(emphasis added).
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tive fair use impact of suppressing DeCSS would have been more ap-
parent. Because the underlying use of a work obtained by circumvent-
ing an access control device would generally constitute theft or direct
infringement, there is little fair use concern in prohibiting the dis-
semination of a technology that enables such circumvention. How-
ever, to the extent that DeCSS enables users who have already ob-
tained authorized access to a DVD to make fair use of their own
property, the justification for suppressing the device is diminished.
Instead of a technology that solely enables illegal behavior, DeCSS
might have been viewed as one enabling lawful fair use. This is espe-
cially true when one considers the statutory proclamation that Section
1201 is not to be interpreted, and a fortiori not applied, to affect the
right of fair use.'98
It is legitimate to question whether the overall impact that the
anti-circumvention provisions may have on fair use is significant in
the context of DeCSS, given that the device is but one of several for-
mats on which movies are available. However, because digital media
is envisioned to eventually include everything from plain text to mov-
ies, the application of such provisions would have far-reaching fair use
implications. For example, if books and periodicals become available
only in digital form, one's ability to make limited copies could disap-
pear. Moreover, because the only option to DVDs is the inferior ana-
log videocassette, it is no answer to suggest that a ready alternative to
DVDs is available for fair use.
The potential impact on fair use should be readily apparent: al-
though circumvention to engage in fair use is not prohibited, the dis-
semination of technology allowing others to engage in fair use is.
Thus, only those with the technical acumen to circumvent encryption
measures like CSS are able to engage in lawful fair use of digital works
that are locked up with encryption. As a result, the effect of the Act
does not square with its legislative history and express statutory decla-
ration that "[n]othing in [§ 1201] shall affect rights, remedies, limita-
tions, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under
[the Copyright Act].' 9 9
The negative impact on fair use is further illustrated by the
Reimerdes decision, which held the Sony doctrine to have been over-
198. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1); see also Recent Cases: Copyright Law-District Court Holds That
Website's Posting of and Linking to Code That Decrypts DVD Copyright Protection Technology Vio-
late Digital Millennium Copyright Act-Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 11l F. Supp. 2d
294 (S.D.N. Y. 2000), Appeal docketed, No. 00-9185 (2nd Cir. Sept. 19, 2000), 114 HARV. L. REV.
1390, 1395-97 (2001) (noting a conflict between § 1201(a), (b) and § 1201(c)(1) and arguing that
courts should interpret the latter as favoring fair use).
199. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (emphasis added).
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ruled to the extent inconsistent with the DMCA. As noted above,
under the Sony doctrine, devices capable of substantial non-infringing
use are exempt from contributory copyright infringement claims. In
Sony, studios filed a contributory infringement suit against Sony. The
studios claimed that consumers of Sony's Betamax video recorders
were using the recorders to make infringing copies of television pro-
grams. The Supreme Court concluded that such so-called "time shift-
ing" by consumers was a fair use activity."' Even if the consumer
copying constituted copyright infringement, however, the Court held
that Sony was not liable as a contributory infringer because the Be-
tamax was an instrumentality of commerce capable of a substantial
non-infringing use."'
Under the DMCA as applied in Reimerdes, however, the Sony
doctrine is inapplicable because the violation of the anti-trafficking
and other provisions of the Act can be shown without regard to
whether the circumvention technology may be used in a manner con-
stituting fair use, a result apparently contemplated by Congress." 2
DeCSS was capable of at least one non-infringing use because it al-
lowed users to decrypt DVDs and play the contents on a computer
powered by the Linux operating system, for which no compliant play-
ers existed at the time. Additionally, DeCSS can be used to decrypt
DVDs to make limited, noncommercial copies, a practice that gener-
ally is exempt from copyright infringement as fair use. Moreover, re-
alizing the potential adverse impact of his holding, Judge Kaplan cor-
rectly noted that "the interests of persons wishing to circumvent CSS
in order to make lawful use of the copyrighted movies it protects are
remarkably varied. "23 Whether such uses rise to the level of being"substantial" is another question, but one that the court did not reach
because Congress specifically excluded the Sony doctrine as a defense
under the DMCA.
Fair use is essential to balance the copyright holders' proprietary
interests against the larger public interest. Rather than an absolute
200. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 (1984).
201. Id. at 456.
202. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 324 (S.D.N.Y.
2000). The court quoted the Judiciary Committee Report on the DMCA: "The Sony test of 'ca-
pab[ility] of substantial non-infringing uses,' while still operative in cases claiming contributory
infringement of copyright, is not part of this legislation, however." HOUSE COMM. ON
JUDICIARY, SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF H.R. 2281 AS PASSED BY THE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ON AUG. 4, 1998, at 9 (Comm. Print 1998). Instead, "[t]he relevant test,
spelled out in the plain and unchanged language of the bill, is whether or not a product or service
'has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent.' Id. The
House and Senate Reports, however, do not refer to this issue.
203. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 338.
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property right created for the intellectual property owners, copyright
is intended to serve the public as "the engine of free expression. "204
The only way to prevent Section 1201 from adversely impacting fair
use is to conclude that the Section is applicable only to the extent that
it does not diminish the fair use right. Essentially, this means that a
Sony defense should be read into the DMCA because to hold other-
wise would have the effect of substantially denying users of digital
media the ability to enjoy their statutorily-prescribed right to make
fair use of copyrighted works.
2. First Amendment Concerns
The failure of the court to fully analyze the impact on fair use has
First Amendment implications as well. First, as applied by the
Reimerdes court, the anti-trafficking provisions burden free speech by
upsetting the balance between copyright and the First Amendment,
thus ceasing to be a valid exercise of Congress's legislative powers.
Second, to the extent that the provisions exceed the scope of Congres-
sional power, they cease to serve an "important or substantial govern-
mental interest" under the intermediate scrutiny test.
In analyzing the constitutionality of the prohibition on posting
DeCSS, the court applied the O'Brien intermediate scrutiny standard
of review, which requires a showing that the injunction serve an im-
portant or substantial governmental interest in a manner narrowly tai-
lored to achieve that interest without unduly interfering with the de-
fendants' expression."' In holding that the anti-trafficking provision
was a legitimate use of Congressional authority, the court focused
primarily on the fact that the DMCA's goal was to prevent copyright
infringement." 6
Given that Section 1201(a)(2) or 1201(b)(1) as applied in
Reimerdes has the potential for limiting fair use and imposing liability
for disseminating a technology facilitating fair use, the issue as to
whether an important or substantial governmental interest is served by
its application deserves a more careful analysis than was given by the
Reimerdes court. In order for the anti-trafficking provisions to consti-
tute an "important or substantial" governmental interest, the interest
itself must be a valid exercise of Congress's power. Because the regu-
204. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). The
court went on to note that although "' [t]he immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a
fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. . ., the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate
[the creation of useful works] for the general public good."' Id. (quoting Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1974)).
205. Reimeredes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 329-330.
206. Id.
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lation of circumvention technology is not directly authorized under the
Copyright Clause, the trafficking provisions are a valid exercise of
Congress's power only to the extent that they are "necessary and
proper" to effectuate such powers under the Clause.0 7 In order for the
trafficking provisions to constitute a valid exercise of power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause, the provisions must be "appropriate"
and "plainly adapted" to the achievement of an enumerated power.208
Assuming, arguendo, that the trafficking provisions in general are
a valid means to effectuate Congress's ends under the Copyright
Clause,0 9 the question remains as to whether the provisions, as ap-
plied against the defendants, actually serve those ends. The Necessary
and Proper Clause is a limitation as well as a grant of power. To the
extent that the continued existence of a robust fair use doctrine is es-
sential to maintain the balance between copyright and free expression,
207. This assumes that Congress implemented the DMCA as a means to effectuate its
Copyright Clause powers; the legislative history is indefinite on this. According to Nimmer, the
House Judiciary Committee originally grounded the authority for the DMCA in the Copyright
Clause, but, in contrast, the House Commerce Committee found the constitutional authority in
the Commerce Clause and the Senate Judiciary Committee report set forth no constitutional ba-
sis. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 18, § 12A.18[A], at 12A-177 (citing respective committee re-
ports). The probable basis for constitutional authority likely rests in the Necessary and Proper
Clause, as a means to effectuate Congress's ends under either the Copyright or Commerce
Clauses. See infra note 208.
208. M'Culloch v. State (McCulloch v. Maryland), 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 421 (1819)
("Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."). In order to be a valid exercise of power
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, legislation must not only be "necessary" in the sense
that it is helpful to achieve an enumerated end but it must also be proper in the sense that the
legislation is a legitimate use of power. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924
(1997) (holding that the requirement that local law enforcement conduct background checks un-
der the Brady Act was not a legitimate exercise of power under the Necessary and Proper and
Commerce Clauses because it violated the principle of state sovereignty).
209. Before even reaching the question of whether Section 1201(b)(1) meets the substantial
interest test, the initial question should have been whether the interest is even within the scope of
Congress's power. Certainly Congress has the power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to
pass legislation to effectuate its authority under the Copyright Clause.
Thus, the anti-trafficking provision, Section 1201(a)(1), is a legitimate exercise of power be-
cause it seeks to inhibit infringement by preventing unauthorized access to copyrighted works.
Had the court been correct in finding that CSS was an access control device and that DeCSS was
a technology circumventing an access control device, application of Section 1201(a)(1) to prohibit
the posting of DeCSS would serve a substantial governmental interest. This is true because no
plausible argument exists in favor of allowing either circumvention of access controls or traffick-
ing in technology that facilitates such circumvention, because generally there is no justification
for gaining unauthorized access to a copyrighted work. In contrast to the anti-trafficking provi-
sion, however, Section 1201(b)(1) seeks to prohibit the dissemination of technology that may be
used not only to engage in copyright infringement but also to engage in legally permissible fair
use. Although prohibiting technology that enables copyright infringement is a legitimate exer-
cise of power under the Copyright Clause through the Necessary and Proper Clause, it is ille-
gitimate to the extent that Section 1201 outlaws technology enabling fair use.
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application of the trafficking provisions to suppress technology that
enables fair use is contrary to the grant of power under the Copyright
Clause. Thus, to the extent that the trafficking provisions, as applied
to suppress the dissemination of DeCSS, work to undermine the abil-
ity of the public to make fair use of digital works, the provisions fail to
advance an important or substantial interest.
Even if the DMCA is intended to serve a substantial governmen-
tal interest, the Reimerdes court's analysis of whether the Act as ap-
plied to the facts of the case satisfied the third prong of the intermedi-
ate scrutiny test is suspect, at least logically. As applied by the court,
the narrow-tailoring requirement becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy,
diminishing the intermediate scrutiny test. The O'Brien test has two
separate requirements besides content neutrality: (1) the regulation
must serve an important or substantial interest and (2) it must do so in
a manner that interferes with speech no more than necessary.21° The
former ensures that the interest is significant enough to warrant inci-
dental restrictions on speech, and the latter limits the restrictions to
what is necessary to the furtherance of the interest. In contrast, the
test applied by the Reimerdes court neglects to evaluate whether the
DMCA is overly restrictive on speech, but instead merely asks
whether the regulation is effective. Under Reimerdes, the anti-
trafficking provisions would be constitutional unless they fail an ad
hoc analysis of whether the existence of the provisions is more effec-
tive than doing nothing, regardless of the extent to which they restrict
speech."'
As the court correctly noted, the intermediate scrutiny test does
not demand that the regulation be the least restrictive means available.
Rather, according to the court, the O'Brien narrow-tailoring require-
ment, as interpreted by the Court in Ward v. Rock Against Racism,"2
demands only that the regulation serve a substantial interest that
would be achieved less effectively without the regulation.1 True, the
Ward Court did state that the narrow-tailoring requirement was satis-
fied where a "regulation promotes a substantial government interest
that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation."2 4 How-
ever, the Court also qualified this holding by explaining that a
210. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (citing United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
211. See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 329-33. The reference to restrictions on the defen-
dants' expression is scant. See id. at 335 ("the First Amendment interests served by the dissemi-
nation of DeCSS... are minimal.").
212. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
213. Id. at 782-83.
214. Id. at 799.
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regulation may not "burden substantially more speech than is neces-
sary to further the government's legitimate interests. '215  Moreover,
Ward and the precedents relied upon therein involved time, place and
manner regulations such as noise or protest ordinances, 216 making the
holding somewhat inapposite for a regulation applied to suppress the
dissemination of a computer program. The Reimerdes court erred by
reducing the intermediate scrutiny test to a question of whether the
DMCA is necessary and effective and failing to consider whether the
regulation "burdens substantially more speech than is necessary to
further the government's legitimate interests. '"217
Even if the mere effectiveness of a regulation were the test of its
constitutionality, it is questionable if the anti-trafficking provisions
measure up. First, although proponents of the DMCA argue that the
anti-trafficking provisions are necessary to bring the United States into
compliance with the WIPO treaties,218 this argument begs the ques-
tion as to whether the protections are really necessary to effectuate the
interest of preserving copyright protections. True, digital works are
extremely susceptible to piracy because the physical limitations associ-
ated with analog copying are almost nonexistent with digital works.
However, copyright management systems are intended to artificially
recreate those physical limitations. The plaintiffs' works are some-
what vulnerable in that perfect copies of their digital works can be
made at little or no cost. However, such vulnerability is somewhat
mitigated by their ability to employ technology like CSS to thwart
copying.
CSS still presents a significant barrier to duplication in spite of
the existence of DeCSS. As the court noted, the process of decrypting,
converting and compressing the files on a DVD is quite laborious and
may take on average a total of twelve hours and a considerable amount
of manipulation. Although DeCSS does not cost anything to make
copies in real dollars, making such copies and using the program re-
quire a significant time investment.
Moreover, although a significant risk may arise when movies,
once decrypted, may be distributed on the Internet for free, the plain-
tiffs failed to produce any evidence that they had suffered any injury
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. One justification for the DMCA was to bring U.S. copyright law into line with the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty and Performances and
Phonograms Treaty. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 18, §§ 12A.01[B]; 12A.02[A]. These treaties
require, inter alia, the adoption of "adequate legal protections" and "effective legal remedies"
against circumvention of technological measures that protect copyrighted works from unauthor-
ized access or use. Id. § 12A.01[B], at 12A-7.
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resulting from this speculative risk. In fact, even a compressed movie
file of 650 megabytes would take an inordinate amount of time to
transmit over normal Internet bandwidths. The greatest threat to pi-
racy is not from DeCSS, but rather from overseas factory operations
that press unauthorized duplicate copies of DVDs.219
Additionally, the actual harm to the plaintiffs' intellectual prop-
erty interests by programs like DeCSS is speculative, at most. Al-
though the Reimerdes court concluded that the continued existence of
DeCSS represented a constant threat to the plaintiffs' intellectual
property interests, the court was forced to admit that there was no di-
rect evidence that the program had actually been used to make illegal
copies of the plaintiffs' movies.2" The court justified the imposition
of injunctive relief with the rather naked declaration that the potential
for harm was virtually incalculable. However, no attempt was made to
calculate the actual or potential damages, and it is equally possible that
DeCSS presents only a de minimus risk of harm to the plaintiffs' inter-
ests.
The experience of the computer software industry illustrates how
speculative the plaintiffs' alleged injury is. The software industry has
managed to develop into one of the largest industries in the world in
the absence not only of anticircumvention laws but also of the sub-
stantial technological copy protections that the plaintiffs enjoy. This
is true despite the fact that computer software is subject to the same
risk of zero-cost perfect copying. Although the software industry
faces significant challenges in reducing losses to copyright infringe-
ment, it has managed to do so without additional governmental regu-
lation.
The Reimerdes case is also illustrative of the impracticality of en-
forcing the DMCA. Once the author of DeCSS posted it on the
Internet, it was available to anyone with an Internet connection. As a
219. See Anthony Kuhn, Widespread DVD Piracy in China a Blow to Hollywood Movies:
Trend Suggests That No Format Is Safe, And That There's A Limit To What The Film Industry
Can Do To Protect Its Product, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 31, 2000, at Cl; see also, Jack Valenti, Record
Number of DVDs Seized in Single Raid in China, Motion Picture Association of America Press
Release (Apr. 27, 2000), available at http://www.mpaa.org/anti-piracy/press/index.htm (last
visited Mar. 6, 2001). Although there was no evidence adduced at trial as to the economic im-
pact that DeCSS supposedly had on the plaintiffs' market for DVD sales and rentals, DVD sales
are expanding rapidly. Owners of DVD players spent approximately $4 billion on DVD movies
in 2000, triple the sales in 1999, and their rental market share increased from 4% to 12% of total
movie rentals. See Mike Snyder, DVD popularity rivaling VHS, CHI. SUN-TIMES 38, Feb. 27,
2001, § 2, available at 2001 WL 7220038. According to the Motion Picture Association of
America, more than $250 million in annual revenue is attributable to videotape piracy, but no
comparative statistics are available for DVDs. See Motion Picture Association of America, Anti-
piracy, available at http://www.mpaa.org/anti-piracy/index.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2001).
220. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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result, taking down individual sites with the program was essentially
pointless, except as a means of possibly intimidating and discouraging
others from making the program available. By the time the plaintiffs
filed suit, the genie was out of the bottle and no reasonable amount of
litigation could put it back. Additionally, to the extent that the pro-
gram is actually used to engage in piracy, the plaintiffs' best remedy is
probably the one that existed prior to the advent of the DMCA: copy-
right infringement actions for direct and contributory infringement.
This raises the important question of whether the anti-trafficking pro-
visions are even capable of advancing the substantial interests that
they putatively serve.
In order to avoid restrictions on speech and fair use, future courts
should apply Section 1201(b)(1) only when there is direct evidence of
copyright infringement attributable to the technology or when there is
no evidence of any substantial non-infringing use of the technology.
By reading the Sony doctrine into the DMCA, the inherent conflict
between the trafficking provisions and Section 1201 (c)(1) is resolved.
Whether DeCSS is capable of substantial non-infringing use is unclear
because the record is not adequately developed on these issues as they
were not central to the resolution of the case. 1 Ultimately, Congress
should amend Section 1201 to add a provision incorporating the Sony
doctrine of substantial non-infringing use as an affirmative defense to
anti-trafficking claims.
B. The Ban On Linking To Sites With DeCSS
The First Amendment concerns attending the ban against the
posting of DeCSS are amplified with respect to the ban against link-
ing. This section argues (1) that the Reimerdes court erred in holding
that the defendants' linking to other DeCSS-containing web sites was
the "functional equivalent" of disseminating DeCSS by posting it on
their own web site; (2) that the court further erred by focusing solely
on the expressive content of DeCSS, when the focus should have been
on the injunction's effect of suppressing the content of the defendants'
web site; and (3) that the errors were compounded by the court's ap-
plication of the intermediate scrutiny standard of review to the sup-
pression of the defendants' hyperlinks because the imposition of the
injunction is unconstitutional even under intermediate scrutiny.
221. As noted above, because proof of copyright infringement is not an element of the anti-
circumvention provisions, there was no effort by the plaintiffs to introduce evidence of actual
copyright infringement by DeCSS users. Although there was some evidence that DeCSS could
be used to decrypt DVD content to facilitate playback on Linux systems, the record is not suffi-
ciently developed on that point to determine whether such use was substantial because the court
rejected the defendants' Sony defense.
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1. The Mechanics of Applying Section 1201 to Linking
Hyperlinks serve as essential elements of expression on the
World Wide Web and are to a great extent what make the Web
unique as a communication forum by providing seamless navigation
between various web sites in order to obtain information. Tim Bern-
ers-Lee explains:
The Web was designed to be a universal space of information,
so when you make a bookmark or a hypertext link, you should
be able to make that link to absolutely any piece of information
that can be accessed using networks. The universality is essen-
tial to the Web: it loses its power if there are certain types of
things to which you cannot link.222
A hyperlink is a bit of code written in a language called Hyper-
text Markup Language. Hyperlink text is generally distinguishable
from non-linked text by underlining and contrasting colors, or it is in
the form of a graphic image. Imbedded in the link is a set of instruc-
tions that cause the user's computer to load the web page referenced in
the link. Rather than having to type the address of the referenced site
into the web browser, linking automates the process. Technically
speaking, when a user clicks on a hyperlink, the user's browser reads
the code, locates the referenced Universal Resource Locator (URL),
and requests a copy of the page located at the referenced URL.223
In many ways, a hyperlink is analogous to a legal citation."'
Much like the function of a legal citation, which serves to alert the
reader for the authority of a proposition and provides a source for ad-
ditional information, imbedding a hyperlink within the content of text
222. Mark Sableman, Link Law: The Emerging Law of Internet Hyperlinks, 4 COMM. L. &
POL'Y 557, 560 (1999) (quoting Tim Berners-Lee, Realising the Full Potential of the Web (based
on a talk presented at the W3C meeting, London, Dec. 3, 1997)), available at
http://www.w3.org/1998/02/Potential.html.
223. See Tsilas, supra note 3, at 85-86. The author states:
Hypertext links (often referred to simply as "links") are the highlighted text, pictures
or logos (including banner advertisements) on the linking website that, when selected,
access the linked-to web page. Technically, after a user selects a site by clicking on
the text, picture or logo, the user's web browser reads the software code, finds the lo-
cation on the Internet that matches the address and requests a copy of the web page.
The computer hosting the linked web page sends the copy back to the user's browser.
The browser on the user's computer reads the code of the copied web page and con-
structs the page according to the transmitted code so that the page appears on the
user's computer screen. Access to the content of the linked-to website is confirmed by
the display of its Universal Resource Locator ("URL"), which replaces the URL of
the previous website on the top portion of the user's browser.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
224. See Amicus Brief of Openlaw Participants at 5, available at http://eon.law.harvard.
edu/openlaw/DVD/amicus.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2001).
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serves the function of alerting the reader that additional information
on the subject matter is available at another virtual location. Beyond
providing a reference, hyperlinks increase the efficiency of communi-
cation by "taking" the reader directly to the source of the information
without the necessity of an additional input. In this way, links differ
from a legal citation, in that the reader is automatically transferred to
the location of the reference source. However, the same is true for
some legal citations as well, as evidenced by services such as Westlaw
and Lexis, which use hyperlinks to integrate legal citations.
The issue before the Reimerdes court was not whether the defen-
dants' activity was, as the court termed it, the "functional equivalent"
to positing DeCSS, but whether the defendants' linking constituted"offering, providing, or otherwise trafficking" in DeCSS.225 The activ-
ity of creating and maintaining a hyperlink defies the categorical de-
scription of offering, providing or trafficking in a technology in that
the defendants lacked any direct control over the content of the web
pages to which they linked. The extent to which a hyperlink to an-
other site facilitated the dissemination of DeCSS depended on at least
two additional factors: (1) whether the owner of the other site made
DeCSS available for download and (2) with the exception of links
automatically starting a download, whether the individual user made
the decision to actually download. As a result, it stretches credulity to
suggest that the defendants were providing, offering, or trafficking in
anything other than pure information.
The providing of mere information, however, does not fall within
the proscription against trafficking in circumvention technology. At
most, the defendants were providing references to other sites that pro-
vided, offered, or trafficked in DeCSS. However, the hyperlink does
not itself "provide" the particular content referred to; it instead creates
a cross-reference. This concept is amply demonstrated by the fact that
the New York Times and CNN linked to the 2600.com website and oth-
ers posting DeCSS.226 To argue that 2600.com was providing or offer-
ing DeCSS by virtue of linking would be to contend that the New York
Times and CNN were as well.
The extension of the injunction to prohibit linking might find
some justification if the linking is viewed as a sort of "contributory
225. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(1).
226. See, e.g., Carl S. Kaplan, Assessing Linking Liability, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2000),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/08/technology/O8CYBERLAW.html. The
article provides a link to the defendants' web site, as did other articles written by Mr. Kaplan
prior to the injunction forcing the defendants to take down their links. Thus, New York Times
was, in effect, aiding in the dissemination of DeCSS while attempting to report on the case, be-
cause DeCSS was available for download at the 2600.com site.
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trafficking" activity. The defendants, after having been forced to re-
move DeCSS from their own web site following the preliminary in-
junction, encouraged others to create "mirror sites" that made DeCSS
available for download. It can be argued then that the defendants ma-
terially contributed to the dissemination of DeCSS to the extent that
they had knowledge of the existence of DeCSS on the other sites, ac-
tively encouraged other sites to post DeCSS, and encouraged visitors
of their web site to utilize the hyperlinks on the 2600.com web site to
obtain copies of DeCSS. On this view, the defendants can be said to
have materially contributed to the trafficking of a circumvention de-
vice, similar to contributory copyright infringement.
Contributory copyright infringement occurs when a person,
"with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materi-
ally contributes to the infringing conduct of another. '227 The doctrine
of contributory infringement is based on the common law tort theory
of joint enterprise liability.228 Joint enterprise liability "rests upon an
analogy to the law of partnership," requiring a relationship involving a"common purpose" and "mutual right of control" over the activity
causing the harm. 229 Although there might have been a common pur-
pose between the defendants and the other web site owners to facilitate
the distribution of DeCSS, there is no indication that the defendants
had any control, direct or indirect, over those other sites. Thus, the
court's decision lacks support by analogy from either contributory in-
fringement or enterprise liability principles.
The strongest argument lies with respect to links that resulted in
the "automatic" download of DeCSS, and the court's characterization
of these links as being the functional equivalent to posting DeCSS is
fairly persuasive. However, the fact remains that once the defendants
took down their own DeCSS posting, the program was no longer avail-
able at a site within their control. Even with links resulting in an
automatic download of the program, the program itself is resident on
the third-party web site, and not on the defendants'. If the third-party
web site hosting the program were to remove it, as many apparently
did subsequent to the injunction against the defendants, the hyperlink
would result in nothing more than an error message. At best, the
plaintiffs were aiding other parties in the dissemination of DeCSS by
providing information, which does not appear to be a violation of Sec-
tion 1201.
227. 3 NIMMER, supra note 18, § 12.04[A][2], at 12-72 (citing Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Co-
lumbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).
228. See id. § 12.04[A][2).
229. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, 475-79 (4th ed. 1971).
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With regard to links referring to a page with an additional hyper-
link that resulted in the download of the program or links to pages
with content other than DeCSS, the causal connection between the
link and the dissemination of DeCSS is even more attenuated. In
those instances, there is at least one intermediate step between a web
surfer's reading of the link and his or her actual downloading of the
program. In any case, distinguishing between different types of links,
as the court did, merely obscures the issue because under no circum-
stances can the act of linking reasonably be held to be the same as that
of posting a computer program.
By distinguishing between permissible and impermissible links,
the court is imputing responsibility based on the intent of the linking
party. This begs the question, however, of whether it is proper to at-
tribute motive and intent to establish derivative liability for linking.
While derivative liability for linking is not by any means a settled legal
question, the Reimerdes court's rule seems to be a departure from the
view taken by another court in a case involving similar circumstances,
as discussed below.
2. First Amendment Issues
The issues pertaining to "linking liability" and First Amendment
freedom are a relatively unsettled area of law. 23° However, two recent
cases shed some light on the divergent paths that courts have taken.
In another DVD case, DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. McLaughlin,231 a
California Superior Court refused to extend a preliminary injunction
to bar linking to sites containing DeCSS code.232 McLaughlin was a
case brought against a defendant shortly before Reimerdes on very
similar facts, but under the trade secret misappropriation theory,
rather than under the DMCA.2 3  Although the McLaughlin court
granted the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction barring the
posting of DeCSS, it refused to extend the injunctive relief to include
linking, citing concerns that "[1] inks to other websites are the mainstay
of the Internet and indispensable to its convenient access to the vast
world of information. A website owner cannot be held responsible for
all of the content of the sites to which it provides links." 2 34 The court
230. See Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Recent Linking Issues, N.Y.L.J. 3, Feb. 8, 2000,
at 1.
231. No. CV 786804, 2000 WL 48512 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 21, 2000) (unpublished order
granting preliminary injunction).
232. Id. at *4.
233. Id. at *1-2.
234. Id. at *4; see also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 836-37 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd,
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), ("[L]inks from one computer to another, from one docu-
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went on to explain that such an injunction to cover linking was unnec-
essary because "the Court has enjoined the posting of the information
in the first instance." 235
In contrast, the Federal District Court for the District of Utah
held in Intellectual Reserve Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministries, Inc. 236
that the First Amendment did not pose a substantial bar against an
anti-linking injunction in a copyright infringement case.237 The court
found that the act of linking to another site with the knowledge that it
contained infringing materials was sufficient to establish a prima facie
case of contributory infringement. 238 The court dismissed the defen-
dants' First Amendment challenge with minimal discussion, stating
"the First Amendment does not give defendants the right to infringe
on legally recognized rights under the copyright law. '239 Reimerdes is
distinguishable from Intellectual Reserve, however, to the extent that in
the latter case, there was evidence of both actual and contributory
copyright infringement, activities that have historically been accorded
no First Amendment protection anyway.24 °
The suppression of the defendants' hyperlinks has a more pro-
found effect on First Amendment rights than does suppression of
posting because of the core importance of links to the structure of the
Internet. The etiology of the court's error lies to a large extent in its
excessive focus on functionality. Although the functional component
of DeCSS is relevant with respect to its evaluation under the O'Brien
standard, the functionality of links should have little to do with
justifying their suppression. DeCSS's functionality is directly related
to the alleged harm it causes. However, the functionality of the defen-
dants' links to sites with DeCSS relates only indirectly to the alleged
harm. The defendants' links did not increase the risk of dissemination
any more than plain-text references would. Instead, they simply made
the expression of information more efficient by obviating the need for
users to manually enter a URL address. The fact that these links
ment to another across the Internet, are what unify the Web into a single body of knowledge, and
what makes the Web unique.").
235. McLaughlin, 2000 WL 48512, at *4. The Reimerdes court, however, came to the op-
posite conclusion, finding that while the plaintiffs could enjoin domestic defendants, the plain-
tiffs would lack jurisdiction to go after overseas defendants. It was felt that a ban against linking
would help prevent domestic computer users from obtaining DeCSS from those overseas sources,
and this was the primary rationale in support of the anti-linking injunction. See Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
236. 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999).
237. Id. at 1295.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1293.
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made the defendants' expression more efficient should not provide a
basis for the suppression of the links. If anything, the efficiency-
enhancing attributes of hyperlinks should be a factor weighing against
the suppression.
a. Level of Scrutiny
Although the DMCA is a facially content-neutral regulation, 241
Congress was at least cognizant of the potential for unwarranted re-
strictions on speech. Congress's awareness is evidenced by the lan-
guage that it included in Section 1203(c) warning that any impositions
of the provisions contained therein are subject to the First Amend-
ment prohibition against prior restraints.242 Conceptually, if not le-
gally, the imposition of an injunction in Reimerdes prohibiting the de-
fendants from linking to other DeCSS-containing sites was
quintessentially content-based even though the DMCA itself is con-
tent and viewpoint-neutral. The plaintiffs desired the injunction pre-
cisely because of the content of the message expressed: that DeCSS
was available for download at the linked sites. The court noted that
the plaintiffs' request "obviously stems in no small part from what the
defendants themselves have termed their act of 'electronic civil dis-
obedience. 24 3 The court went on to state that the defendants' linking
was "an attempt to defeat the purpose of the preliminary injunction by
(a) offering the practical equivalent of making DeCSS available on
their own web site by electronically linking users to other sites still of-
fering DeCSS, and (b) encouraging other sites that had not been en-
joined to offer the program. ' 244 Because the purpose of the injunction
was to prohibit the defendants from engaging in a course of expressive
conduct, the injunction should be evaluated carefully in order to en-
sure that the defendants' right to free expression was not unduly inter-
fered with in order to achieve the intended purpose of the DMCA.245
241. Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on the
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 413 (1999). Interestingly, while the
Reimerdes court cited this source in support of the proposition that the DMCA is content-
neutral, 111 F. Supp. at 329, Professor Benkler actually filed an amicus brief against the imposi-
tion of an injunction in this case. See Brief of Americus Curiae Professor Yochai Benkler, Uni-
versal Studies, Inc. v. Corley (No. CV 0277) (filed 2000) (in Support of Defendant's Cross-
Motion to Vacate the Preliminary Injunction), available at http://eon.law.harvard.edu/
openlaw/DVD/filings/NY/0612-benkler-amicus.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2000). Professor
Benkler's article provides an excellent critical discussion of the history and possible First
Amendment implications of the DMCA.
242. 17 U.S.C. § 1203(c).
243. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 324.
244. Id. at 324-25.
245. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Openlaw Participants, Corley, (No. Civ 0277) (in support
of defendants arguing that injunction against linking constitute a content-based restriction of
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However, under current free speech jurisprudence, "[t]he princi-
pal inquiry in determining content neutrality ... is whether the gov-
ernment has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement
with the message it conveys. "246 In making this determination, "[t]he
government's purpose is the controlling consideration," and if the
regulation fulfills "purposes unrelated to the content of expression it is
deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or
messages but not others." '247
Under these standards, the DMCA is a content-neutral regula-
tion because its restriction on expression can be "justified without ref-
erence to content of the regulated speech."24 The principal purpose of
the DMCA generally, and the anti-trafficking provisions specifically,
is to protect copyright holders from infringement by providing them
with legal protection supplementing their use of encryption technol-
ogy, and the Act does so without reference to the content of any ex-
pression.249 The Reimerdes court was correct in applying the interme-
diate scrutiny standard of review as the DMCA restricts the
defendants' expressive activities substantially, but only as an unin-
tended consequence of its regulatory purpose. The rational is that the
DMCA does not intentionally discriminate against particular types of
speech, but instead imposes a blanket prohibition on certain conduct
that may incidentally restrict expression. However, the court errone-
ously concluded that an injunction barring hyperlinks satisfied this in-
termediate level of scrutiny.
b. The Injunction and Intermediate Scrutiny
A content-neutral regulation that incidentally affects expression
will be upheld if "it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest."250 A content-neutral regulation generally meets the
requirement of narrow tailoring if it achieves an important interest"that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation."25
speech), available at http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/DVD/amicus.html (last visited Nov.
20, 2000).
246. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
247. Id.
248. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984).
249. See Benkler, supra note 241.
250. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (quoting United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
251. Id. (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).
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There are a number of factors weighing in favor of finding a substan-
tial governmental interest served by the anti-trafficking ban as ap-
plied.
First, as discussed above, copyright law furthers the important
interest of creating a lucrative "marketplace of ideas" for authors to
exploit the economic value of their work, and the anti-circumvention
and trafficking provisions are a necessary and appropriate means to
further this end, by making the digital and online environment a safe
place to conduct business.252 Second, the benefits that accrue from the
multi-billion-dollar copyright and information technology industry are
an essential component of the national economy.2"3 Finally, the gov-
ernment has an interest in maintaining the rule of law, and allowing
electronic piracy to go unchecked would substantially undermine this
interest.
On the other hand, the First Amendment concerns pertaining to
the prohibition against the posting of DeCSS, as discussed above in
Section III(A)(2), are equally relevant to the linking issue. As ex-
plained in that section, there is a genuine question as to whether the
anti-trafficking provisions, as applied to DeCSS, exceed Congress's
authority under the Copyright and Necessary and Proper Clauses due
to the provisions' incompatibility with traditional notions of fair use.
There is also an issue as to whether the application of Section 1201 to
linking serves an important or substantial interest, given that there is
no evidence of any actual injury to the plaintiffs and the risk of injury
is speculative at best. Even if the application of the anti-trafficking
provisions to linking serves a substantial governmental interest, the
third prong of the O'Brien standard is even more difficult to be sus-
tained with respect to linking.
There are three fundamental errors with respect to the Reimerdes
court's suppression of the hyperlinks to DeCSS-containing sites.
First, the court's use of functionality to justify treating linking as a
proxy for posting unduly interfered with the defendants' right to free
expression because the fact that hyperlinks are a more efficient mode
of communication does not provide a basis for their suppression. Sec-
ond, the ban on linking fails to meet the alternative formulation of the
intermediate scrutiny test in that it is not tailored to achieve the gov-
ernmental interest more effectively than the absence of an injunction.
The court's focus on the functionality of links fails to provide an
adequate basis for their suppression. In the court's view, the hyper-
252. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 330 (S.D.N.Y.
2000); see also discussion supra Section III(A)(2).
253. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 330.
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links to other DeCSS-containing sites was merely a proxy for posting
DeCSS directly on the 2600.com web site. The court erred by attribut-
ing far too much weight to the functionality of the link and by neglect-
ing the link's expressive content. True, hyperlinks enhance speech by
making navigation between web sites more efficient. Beyond this
speech-enhancing difference, however, there is little difference be-
tween a hyperlink and a plain-text reference. As the Supreme Court
noted, the functionality of computer code does not provide a basis for
qualifying First Amendment protection.5 4
First, the fact that the defendants chose to publish the addresses
for DeCSS-containing web sites using hyperlinks rather than plain text
is irrelevant because the putative harm that the court was seeking to
prevent was the dissemination of DeCSS, not linking itself. To the ex-
tent that referring users to other DeCSS-containing sites represented a
substantial risk to the plaintiffs' interests, such risk exists whether the
URL addresses for those sites are communicated via a hyperlink, plain
text, or even via word of mouth. Certainly, the court would not pre-
vent the defendants from orally communicating alternative sources for
DeCSS. The court was also apparently unwilling to prohibit the de-
fendants from posting the URL addresses for other DeCSS sites in
plain, non-hyperlink text, as evidenced by the fact that such a list still
exists on the defendants' web site.
Second, this illusory distinction between plain-text and hyper-
link-enhanced speech departs from settled First Amendment law in
that the Supreme Court has made clear that the functionality of code
or the Internet provides no basis for qualifying First Amendment pro-
tection.2"' Furthermore, the existence of inferior, alternative modes of
expression, such as plain-text references, does not provide a basis for
suppression.2"6 If the court is justified in suppressing the defendants'
expression, that justification must rest on its power to suppress the
content of the expression, regardless of its form.
The injunction against linking actually restricts the defendants'
speech more than is necessary to achieve the interest of protecting the
plaintiffs' intellectual property rights. This is because the injunction
deprives the defendants of their preferred method of expression. In
analyzing the extent to which the injunction imposes on the defen-
dants' First Amendment rights, the links must be considered in terms
of the overall message that they were attempting to express. The links
254. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 845 (1997).
255. See id.
256. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 803-05 (2000) (hold-
ing that the fact that the transmission of adult programming was burdened rather than prohib-
ited provided no basis for qualifying First Amendment scrutiny).
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at issue in the Reimerdes case were contained in a page of the defen-
dants' web site entitled "News Archive. 2 7  This archive can accu-
rately be characterized as symbolic speech advocating defiance of the
injunction barring the defendants and others from posting DeCSS.
Under a banner declaring, "Stop the MPAA," the defendants stated,
"We have to face the possibility that we could be forced into submis-
sion. For that reason, it's especially important for as many of you as
possible, all throughout the world, take a stand and mirror these
files. 25 8 This page remains in existence today and includes a lengthy
list of the URL addresses for sites that purport to offer DeCSS for
download in plain, non-hyperlink text.2" 9 It seems clear that the de-
fendants' use of the hyperlinks, while facilitating the dissemination of
DeCSS, was an integral aspect of the defendants' expressive message.
In essence, the defendants were expressing the view that DeCSS
should not be subject to regulation, and the hyperlinks provided a ref-
erence amounting to the effect of "see this web site for additional in-
formation, including a copy of DeCSS." Moreover, the injunction en-
tirely prohibits the defendants from linking to several hundred web
sites solely on the basis that DeCSS may exist on these sites. This
forecloses the defendants from communicating by linking with those
sites, regardless of whether the purpose in doing so is to disseminate
DeCSS.
Finally, the injunction fails to "promote a substantial govern-
mental interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regu-
lation. ' 26" The governmental interest of protecting against copyright
infringement is not served any better by an injunction banning linking
than it would be without such an injunction. By the time the
Reimerdes case was decided, DeCSS was available anywhere in the
world via the Internet. The court even conceded that an injunction
against linking would be a less effective alternative than obtaining in-
junctions directly prohibiting the other sites from posting DeCSS.261
The court's sole rationale for the linking injunction was that it would
prevent domestic Internet users from accessing DeCSS on foreign web
sites, over which the plaintiffs would not otherwise be able to obtain
257. Reimerdes, Ill F. Supp. 2d at 340; see also 2600 News, The Hacker CSC Quarterly,
News Archives, available at http://www.2600.com/dvd/docs/.
258. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 313.
259. See 2600 News, The Hacker CSC Quarterly, News Archives, available at http://www.
2600.com/news/1999/1227-help.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2001). Obviously, a reader of this
web page can merely "cut" the text of the URL and "paste" it onto the address toolbar of their
browser in order to achieve the same effect as a hyperlink. This fact makes the efficacy of the
injunction against linking questionable.
260. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).
261. See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 340; cf. McLaughlin, 2000 WL 48512, at *4.
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jurisdiction.262 This ignores the facts that the 2600.com web site was
merely a conduit to those overseas sites and that they could and can
still be easily located by entering the search string "DeCSS" into any
search engine. Whatever effect the injunction might possibly have
had on minimizing the spread of DeCSS would have been so minimal
as to be of almost no constitutional significance and certainly did not
justify the substantial burden placed on the defendants' expression.
c. The Chilling Effect on Linking
The Reimerdes court recognized the potential chilling effect re-
sulting from a ban on linking, noting that the imposition of "strict li-
ability on a web site operator for the entire contents of any web site to
which the operator linked therefore would raise grave constitutional
concerns . "..."263 Although the court acknowledged these First
Amendment concerns, the legal standard it created is inadequate to
prevent a chilling effect on linking. The court's adoption of a legal
standard similar to that used in defamation cases is a novel approach,
but this approach ultimately causes more problems than it solves and
is insufficient to cure the defects noted above.
The court's rule does raise the evidentiary bar to minimize the
chilling effect on linking because the ruling applies only to persons
who knowingly and intentionally facilitate in the trafficking of a cir-
cumvention technology. Any person engaged in such an activity
should be sufficiently on notice, or should know, that they are engaged
in unlawful conduct. Thus, like the "actual malice" requirement for
public figure defamation liability, this element of scienter places a
strong limitation on the scope of the rule. Furthermore, a requirement
of proof by clear and convincing evidence provides an additional safe-
guard against improper issuance of injunctions.
However, the analogy between defamation and linking is some-
what inapposite because linking to circumvention technology does not
involve the same sort of speech at issue in defamation cases. Liability
for defamation requires proof of the publication of a falsehood. As a
general matter, false and defamatory statements are not accorded full
First Amendment protection.
By comparison, the linking to a site containing DeCSS involves
no falsity; instead, under the Reimerdes rule, the critical issue is
whether the defendant engaged in linking in order to disseminate ille-
gal circumvention technology. Unlike defamation, where the actual
publication of the falsehood is direct and central to the injury, it is the
262. See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 340.
263. Id.
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potential effect produced by the link, rather than the link itself, that is
the cause of the injury. Not only does the link itself produce no direct
injury to the plaintiffs' interests, the dissemination of DeCSS produces
no direct harm because the program is harmful to the plaintiffs' copy-
right interests only when it is actually used to engage in infringement.
Therefore, the threat of harm attending the linking to DeCSS-
containing sites is much more attenuated than that attending the pub-
lication of libelous statements. In this way, linking is treated much
like the utterance of "fighting words" or other speech that is accorded
minimal scrutiny not because of its content per se, but because its rela-
tive expressive value is substantially outweighed by the "clear and pre-
sent danger" presented by its utterance. On this rationale, the
Reimerdes rule might be justified if the interests sought to be protected
are sufficiently proximate and serious, but as explained above, they are
not.
The Reimerdes court concluded that the defendants linked to
other sites in an effort to encourage broad dissemination of DeCSS,
thereby bringing their activity within the parameters of its newly cre-
ated rule. The problem with this rule is that it seems to provide much
more protection against chilling speech than it actually does. Even
though the rule adequately raises the evidentiary bar, the threat of
lawsuits and injunctions still exists. Faced with the expense and un-
certainty associated with litigating the issues of knowledge and intent
to disseminate, web site operators may simply choose to remove links
rather than risking litigation. Moreover, a rule such as this, if applied
broadly to linking liability, will increase the transaction costs associ-
ated with linking by necessitating investigation of the linked-to sites to
ferret out any possible illegal content because merely disclaiming re-
sponsibility for off-site content may not be sufficient to avoid litiga-
tion and eventual liability. In sum, while the court's rule may make it
more difficult for plaintiffs to obtain anti-linking injunctions, it is not
likely to reduce the chilling effect that the threat of such suits imposes.
V. CONCLUSION
At the time of writing, the judgment in Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Reimerdes is being appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. The defendants-appellants are asserting that the DMCA, as
applied, violates the First Amendment.264 An impressive array of
amici have emerged in support of overturning the trial court judg-
264. See Appellant's Brief, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes (No. 00-9185) (2nd
Cir. filed Sep. 18, 2000).
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ment, including the ACLU, numerous prominent legal scholars, com-
puter scientists, and so-called "fair use interests." 265
Professors Lawrence Lessig and Yochai Benkler joined on a brief
arguing, inter alia, that the DMCA, as applied, unconstitutionally re-
stricts free speech and fair use.266 Although Lessig and Benkler as-
sume that the appropriate standard for review is intermediate scrutiny,
the ACLU maintains that the appropriate standard for review is strict
scrutiny.267 In addition to the fair use and free speech arguments made
at trial and on appeal by the defendants, a group of law professor amici
suggest that the DMCA is not a valid exercise of Congress's power
under the Copyright or Commerce Clauses to the extent that the Act
exceeds the grants of power under those clauses and conflicts with the
First Amendment.268
The plaintiffs-appellees are to some extent looking a gift horse in
the mouth because they are suggesting that the DeCSS code does not
deserve any First Amendment scrutiny. 269 They too have substantial
allies in support of the lower court decision. Not only has a group of
copyright industry allies filed an amicus brief in support of the plain-
tiffs, 270 but the Attorney General has also intervened on behalf of the
United States in support of the application of the DMCA.271
To some extent, the trial court ruling may have been an expected
consequence of the defendants' so-called "electronic civil disobedi-
ence." Rather than being viewed as a media outlet disseminating in-
formation, Mr. Corley and his web site were viewed as part of a crimi-
nal hacker culture. The question is whether the viewpoint of a
particular defendant is at all relevant to the application of a statute that
even the court agreed has some impact on speech and a significant im-
pact on traditional notions of fair use. At least as a matter of principle,
265. A complete list of links to the amicus briefs is available at http://eon.law.harvard.edu/
openlaw/DVD/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2001).
266. See Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Yochai Benkler and Lawrence Lessig, Reimerdes
(No. 00-9185), available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/lessig/content/testimony/dvd/dvd.
pdf (last visited Mar. 2001) (in Support of Appellant).
267. See Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU et al. at 7, Reimerdes (No. 00-9185), available at
http://www.aclu.org/court/corley.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2001).
268. See generally Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Law Professors, Reimerdes (No. 00-
9185) (Supporting Reversal in Support of Defendants-Appellants), available at http://www.eff.
org/IP/Video/MPAADVDcases/20010126_nyjlawprofs_anicus.htm (last visited Mar. 14,
2001).
269. See Plaintiffs-Appellees' Brief, Reimerdes (No. 00-9185), available at http://cryptome.
org/mpaa-v-2600-bpa.htm, (last visited Mar. 14, 2001).
270. See Brief of Amici Curiae Recording Indus. Ass'n of America (RIAA) et al.,
Reimerdes (No. 00-9185), available at http://www.mpaa.org/Press/DeCSSFinalAmicubrief.htm
(last visited Mar. 14, 2001).
271. See Brief of Intervenor United States of America, Reimerdes (No. 00-9185), available
at http://cryptome.org/mpaa-v-2600-usa.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2001).
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the Constitution has never permitted disparate treatment on the basis
of viewpoint.
Two fundamental premises emanate from the Reimerdes decision.
First, computer code constitutes speech that deserves some level of
First Amendment protection. Second, even though computer code
constitutes "protected speech," making computer code available on
the Internet for dissemination may, under certain circumstances, be
illegal. It is difficult to disagree with these high-level generalities. To
say that computer code is not speech for First Amendment purposes
would be akin to saying that English is protected speech, but Latin is
not. Likewise, to suggest that the government is powerless to regulate
code because code by definition constitutes speech, regardless of the
consequences, is an invitation to anarchy. The question is how far
code can be regulated without violating traditional First Amendment
freedoms.
If the Reimerdes judgment is upheld, the clear message is that
traditional fair use principles will be undermined because the users of
digital works will be subject to the copyright holders' control as to
what uses may be made of their work, regardless of whether such con-
trol is granted to the holder under copyright law. Although the im-
pact with respect to DVDs may not appear extensive, it will become
much more prevalent as traditional media such as books, newspapers,
and entertainment are increasingly converted into digital and online
formats. Presently, one wishing to make limited copies from a book or
periodical may do so under traditional fair use rules. If the particular
work is in digital form and protected by a copyright management sys-
tem, however, a fair use copy could only be made to the extent that the
copyright holder permitted it. This sort of control distorts the balance
between copyright and free expression. If copyright is truly the "en-
gine of free expression" and fair use is essential to balance the interests
of the copyright holders against the public interests that copyright law
is intended to serve, then any attempt to restrict fair use beyond its
traditional parameters should be viewed as an unconstitutional exer-
cise of power under the Copyright Clause.
The imposition of the injunction against linking raises grave con-
stitutional concerns. The Internet is becoming a substantial medium
for free expression, in addition to its commercial applications. Any
restriction on hyperlinking should be reviewed very carefully and
should be applied only when truly necessary to achieve an interest of a
high order. In the Reimerdes case, the trial court erred by focusing too
much on the functionality of hyperlinks and not enough on the nature
and extent of the restrictions placed on the defendants' free expres-
20011
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sion. With respect to links, the attribute of functionality is what
makes the Internet unique as an expressive medium because linking
makes communication more efficient. The efficiency of a mode of
communication should never be the test for its proscription.
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